The French, unlike the Prussians, put their trust in technology. The French were convinced that their new .51 calibre Chassepot rifle would win the day. The breech loading Chassepot was superior to the Needle gun in range and accuracy. This was achieved because the breech was sealed with a rubber ring, which dramatically reduced the amount of gas that escaped. They were also placing great stock in what they considered a secret weapon, the mitrailleuse, which was a crank-operated machine-gun. It was so cloaked in secrecy that tactics were not developed for its use. It was in fact used as a substitute for artillery, which was still muzzle loaded. This misapplication of the machine-gun would end as a dismal failure. Unfortunately, the lacklustre performance of the machinegun would cause many to neglect it before the First World War, and a lack of machine-guns would be a handicap at the beginning of the war, specifically for the British. However, it would not be the technological innovations of the Chassepot or the machine-gun that would carry the day: it would be the superior doctrine of the Prussians. Von Moltke used his cavalry as an effective screen to mask the movement of his forces at Gravelotte-St. Privat and Sedan. In both cases, he was able to envelop the French, who were then immediately forced to go on the attack where they were cut down by Prussian defensive firepower.

In two wars against technically more advanced armies, the Prussians demonstrated that it was not technology alone that decided battle but sound doctrine. The key to Prussian doctrine was that, it was based on historical studies that without bias, examined war and technology to come up with lessons. Rather than treating technological innovations as a panacea, their studies recognized the capabilities and limitations of the current technology and came up with doctrine that employed it to its best advantage.

In this time of great change, it was perhaps the Prussian Army that took the most correct approach to evolving technologies. By the 1860s, the Prussian Army had not had much in the way of combat experience since the battle of Waterloo. In fact, prior to the Danish War, the Prussian Army had not been in combat since 1815, and even the war against Denmark was not large enough to expose the bulk of the army to combat. If the Prussian Army was to be effective in this time of dynamic change, it would have to find a way to overcome its limitations caused by a lack of experience.

During the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, the Prussian Army would demonstrate that they had decisively mastered the new technology that was revolutionizing the conduct of war. The keys to success would not be the introduction of some sort of wonder weapon like the needle gun, but rather their success would lie in the introduction of doctrinal advances, which were introduced by the Prussian General Staff and its Chief Helmuthe von Moltke.

The Prussian Army had a permanent staff system in place since 1790. The Prussian Truppengeneralstab (or General Staff), by 1870, would become the standard to which all other staffs were measured. In the later half of the 19th century, it would prepare the Prussian Army well for the conflicts to come. The Prussian Staff was unique for that time. Unlike other staffs, it was permanent in peacetime and war. Its organization was also unique in that not only did it have an operational focus, but it also had a very professional railway section, which was charged with making plans for the rapid deployment and mobilization of the army in time of war. It also had a Historical Section, which was tasked to study conflicts of the recent past and provide lessons learned for the Prussian Army. In this time of great technological change, it was perhaps this section which would best prepare the Prussian Army, and then the German Army, for wars of the future, from the Franco-Prussian War up to and including the Blitzkrieg of WWII.

From the study of Austria's war with Sardinia and France in 1859, the Prussians learned that reliance on defensive firepower could be countered by the use of mobile hard-hitting assault columns. From the American Civil War, the Prussians learned that war with accurate weapons caused egregious casualties. They were also aware that they could ill afford to conduct attrition warfare on the same scale as the Union Army. The Chief of the Prussian General Staff, Helmuthe von Moltke, had personally observed the devastating effects of defensive firepower during the Danish War at the tactical level. In answer to this, von Moltke came up with the doctrine of “strategic offence” with defence at the “tactical level.”

In 1865 von Moltke wrote: The attack of a position is becoming notably more difficult than its defence. The defensive during the first phase of battle offers a decisive superiority. The task of a skillful offensive will consist of forcing our foe to attack a position chosen by us, and only when casualties, demoralisation, and exhaustion have drained his strength will we ourselves take up the tactical offensive…. Our strategy must be offensive, our tactics defensive.

Prussian doctrine concentrated on advancing to an area that would most threaten the enemy (e.g., a line of communication or a flank). The Prussians would then go on the defensive. The enemy would subsequently be forced to attack in order to break out or maintain its lines of communication. Then, using the accurate firepower of the rifle, the Prussians would bleed the enemy white and continue the advance on the strategic level.

Von Moltke used this doctrine to great effect in 1866 during the Prussian Seven Week’s War with Austria. With the aid of the railway and the telegraph, the Prussian Staff planned and executed a brilliant deployment. As von Moltke was not aware of the Austrians intentions, he deployed his forces on a broad 200-mile front. Von Moltke’s plan was to make contact with the main Austrian Army in order to pin it with one army, so that he could encircle it and crush it with a second army. However, his intentions did not translate well to the lower echelons, and, although he did deliver a crushing blow to the Austrians, the independent actions of some lower commanders prevented the Prussians from completely encircling the Austrians.

The Austrian plan was to use interior lines of communication to concentrate and destroy the Prussian forces piecemeal, in classic Napoleonic form. Benedek, the Austrian commander, decided to make his stand at Sadowa, approximately 10 miles west of the Elbe River, which constituted a major obstacle. The Elbe had one permanent bridge and one pontoon bridge, which was anchored on the fortress city of Koniggratz (from which the battle takes its name). This latter bridge could provide a withdrawal route for the Austrians should it be required. In order to hold this defensive position, Benedek deployed 215 000 infantry and 750 guns.

The Prussian 1st Army made contact with the Austrian position at 0400 hrs on 3 July. The commander of 1st Army had decided to commence his attack at 1000 hrs after his troops had been rested and fed. This was over-ruled by von Moltke. A delay in attacking and fixing the Austrians might allow them to slip away before 2nd Army could encircle them. Von Moltke instead ordered 1st Army to attack immediately. Unfortunately, von Moltke had no way of knowing that the Austrians had no intention of withdrawing; this unprepared attack would play right into their hands. The battle ebbed and flowed and degenerated into a confusing morass as commanders lost control of their troops. For a time, the Prussians thought that the battle was lost, but von Moltke was unshaken. By noon, 2nd Army threatened the Austrian right; the Austrians were forced to mount costly counterattacks against massed rifle fire in order to delay the Prussians long enough to enable a withdrawal across the River Elbe. Shortly after the battle, the Austrians conceded defeat and sued for peace. Von Moltke's doctrine had been a success.

After the war, the Prussians went back to study their own effectiveness to see if there were any lessons to be learned. As a result, they moved their artillery from the rear of its columns to the front and deployed their cavalry well forward to conduct reconnaissance. Within four years, the Prussians would be at war again. This time, with the French.

As the war continued, antitank defenses increased and it became increasingly important to react more flexibly to developing situations. Large maneuver elements were often not in a position to do that. Combat-ready tanks (at times without concern for what company they belonged to) were assembled into a "gepanzerte Gruppe" (armored group) and reinforced with SPW-Kompanien (armored-personnel carrier companies). These then formed so-called "Panzerkampfgruppen." Panzerpionier and artillery forces were generally assigned to support them. Depending on the situation, the PanzerautkHirungsabteilung might also be involved. In this case, however, it was frequently employed more in the role of a (light) Panzergrenadierbataillon than for reconnaissance purposes. Divisions that had two Panzerabteilungen could also form two Kampfgruppen, though one of the battalions would have to work with a towed artillery battalion supporting it.

This combination of armored forces proved to be the most successful organization of troops. Only the "purebred" combination that was the Panzerkampfgruppe constituted a team of combined arms. It could work together in ideal fashion due to its armor and comparable operational and tactical mobility. None of the different branches had to exert undue concern for the other or employ it in a situation that endangered it.

The non-armored portion of the division served as the reserve, guarded areas or acted as normal positional troops in defense. That often caused logistical problems, since the Schwerpunkt (point of main effort) usually had to be with the Panzerkampfgruppe. Additional problems arose because no staff for the Kampfgruppe was permanently organized. Instead, it had to be formed by arbitrarily taking people from the parent organization. It would have been more proficient to have a permanent personnel organized for it. Armored battalions were also not given the logistical capacity to operate separately.

The organization and equipment of the PanzeraufkHirungsabteilung also did not prove successful. Rather, it left the regiments and battalions lacking their own efficient reconnaissance elements. As for Introduction xiii the Panzerjagerabteilung was concerned, it was increasingly proposed to integrate it by companies into the infantry regiments or even into the Panzergrenadierbataillone, since the antitank battalion was only suitable for limited separate employment anyway.

The Panzerkampfgruppe as an organization was not officially introduced during the war. Instead existing organizations were improved incrementally, such as by the formation of supply companies. Inadequate to the end were the numbers and the outfitting of the Panzergrenadiere, the latter due to the lack of adequate production of SPW's. Most were only motorized and, in fact, really only infantry, since they had to perform all assignments dismounted.

With regard to logistics, the attack is the most demanding form of combat. The consumption of ammunition and fuel is high. Great distances yawn between the attacking forces and their own troops and movement is through territory that is threatened by the enemy. In the defense one expects high expenditure of ammunition and can build up corresponding reserves and conceal them. Engineer supplies for construction of obstacles and barriers can be placed at the ready in adequate quantity and with less time pressure. Additional artillery ammunition can be held in reserve in firing positions. None of that is possible in the attack. The only simpler logistical operation is the recovery of out-of-action vehicles that have been left behind. Attempting to recover vehicles during a delaying operation or a withdrawal is obviously much more difficult.

In armored combat logistical planning is of paramount importance and should be viewed as having a priority equivalent to planning the tactical commitment. In light of the short operating range of the vehicles, fuel supply is especially difficult. It is often necessary to have a brief refueling halt after completion of the approach march to the line of departure immediately before the attack. Considering the threat posed by artillery, that is anything but an easy decision!

During the course of the attack, refueling must come at timely intervals before consumption reduces vehicular fuel supplies to a level where movements have to be stopped. One strives to refuel when about 50 percent of the on-board fuel has been consumed. That was frequently possible during the night, since movements were generally halted in unknown territory during the hours of darkness. The company leaders need to report promptly and establish contact points on the ground for rendezvous with supply vehicles. After having made the link up they should remain in the combat zone no longer than necessary and must be sent back immediately. Since the distance to the supply points are often great, the practice of partially emptying and then hanging onto supply vehicles for later availability would be fatal. The drivers of the supply vehicles have a hard time during offensive operations. Often they are on the road day in and day out and sleep is only possible for a few hours during the drive when the assistant driver takes the wheel. Supply of the leading formations is especially critical. Since those formations have to operate without contact with the following troops, they have to integrate their logistical vehicles in their own organization and continuously protect them against enemy action with combat vehicles. Any opportunity to drain the tanks of broken-down friendly vehicles or abandoned enemy vehicles and refuel from them must be used. Phased supply from the air may also be used. In Belgium and northern France, Panzergruppe Kleist was only able to advance so rapidly in 1940 because the local network of gas stations was well established.

German 88-mm Flak Guns

Chief of Staff of the Kondor Legion Wolfram von Richthofen

The German participation in the Spanish Civil War was an experience that incorporated a number of principal-agent relationships conducive to innovation. The Luftwaffe units in Spain were exposed to important external information, were informal in much of their organizational structure, and necessitated a very close yet unrestrictive relationship between agents experimenting in actual combat and the high-level principals monitoring them. The German Army was able, from 1936- 1939, not only to test innovation already accomplished but also to further advance existing doctrine through direct participation in the Spanish Civil War.

At the start of the Spanish Civil War, commander Francisco Franco of the Nationalist Forces passed to two German businessmen a message requesting military aid from Germany. Hitler eagerly assented and commanded Goring to begin using the Luftwaffe for aid, which began with airlifting Spanish military personnel and equipment from northern Africa to Spain. In an impressive demonstration of German military efficiency and readiness in 1936, a significant German presence was on the ground in Africa assisting only four days after Hitler’s decision. The full four years of participation with Franco’s forces, from 1936-1939, provided the Luftwaffe with a wide range of experience in air and joint land-air operations, and provided ideal testing of innovations in armor doctrine. The German participation went further than simply practicing and testing their current doctrine; the campaign was structurally unique in that the force was relatively small and tightly-knit, and necessitated a simple, informal command structure that grouped both Army and Luftwaffe units under a single Luftwaffe command, the Condor Legion.

Commanders were of high quality, forward thinking, and tactically very hands on. Junior officers had many opportunities for expressing new ideas, that they were able to directly test in actual combat. The poor quality of the opponent and near absence of air opposition encouraged realistic experimentation without fear of heavy losses, especially in the area of joint air-land operations.

By October 1936 the Spanish civil war had developed into a stalemate, prompting the Wehrmacht high command to increase the small German force there into a larger operation. The force was upgraded to over 5,000 Luftwaffe personnel using over 100 of their most advanced aircraft; the new force was named the Condor Legion—it included a bomber group, fighter group, reconnaissance group, staff, flak battalion, logistics supply battalion, and medical group. New preproduction prototype German aircraft models were included for combat testing. Army participation included a tank battalion and around two hundred military advisors, supported by the Condor Legion logistics group and all serving under Major General Hugo Sperrle and Chief of Staff von Richthofen, both senior Luftwaffe officers. During the subsequent years of combat the Germans would gain the opportunity to test a wide array of new aircraft and to assess their military faults and benefits, making the needed changes. Equally important was the constant testing of tactics and combat formations with the new weaponry.

This informal command structure, placing both the Luftwaffe and Army under the same command, was important in helping produce the air-ground coordination and blitzkrieg innovations soon to come. It was a simple structure; the commander of the Condor Legion reported directly to the Special Staff W (the high command structure in Germany coordinating the effort), which reported to the Army high command. The Condor Legion had the benefit of an easy access to the highest levels of leadership, yet enjoyed relative freedom from intrusive oversight. They were separated geographically and possessed tactical authority to control the course of the war. Hitler and the central government showed almost no interest in the day to day management of the operation, leaving the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe to direct the effort. The lack of micro-management by central command allowed Condor Legion commanders to operate as agents with more freedom to experiment and incorporate. These commanders were also principals of the Condor Legion, and the disentanglement from central command provided stronger principal-agent links between these commanders and their agents in the field.

Commanders Sperrle and Richthofen were very hands-on commanders, overseeing attacks and constantly constructing forward bases so that they could personally witness the actions. The difficulty of coordinating air-ground attacks, especially with Spanish forces, necessitated this intense involvement, but it allowed the highest command level—commander and chief of staff—to see innovative air-ground tactics employed first-hand. Richthofen had come to Spain specifically hoping to see the Luftwaffe and its equipment in action, and has been described as the “spiritual mentor” of close air support development by Karl Ries and Hans Ring in their book on the Condor Legion. The highly vested commander is an important commodity for innovation, and the command in Spain was both eager to succeed and willing to remain ever-present during innovative tactical operations. As with the German maneuver, it becomes obvious how important it can be for leaders to personally witness innovation.

Agents of course had incentives to successfully innovate because they were involved in actual combat, and despite the obviously inferior nature of the enemy, their lives were dependent on the success of the operation. Even the junior officers not directly exposed to combat were responsible for the successful execution of a real war effort. Another benefit of having a small and somewhat independent operating force was demonstrated by the ability of junior officers to express novel ideas to higher command. One young lieutenant, Werner Molders, developed ideas on tactical fighter formations that were implemented during the course of the operation in Spain. He changed the traditional three plane “V” formation into a pair formation, a superior structure which the Condor Legion used to great effect. The combination of the highly vested yet unrestricted leadership and small operating core of junior officers with incentive to innovate is a perfect example of the proper principal-agent relationship, neither excessively top-down nor bottom-up.

Another informal aspect of the German command in Spain was the necessity of operating through the Nationalist Spanish command in order to coordinate with ground units. At first this might seem like a detriment to the process of innovation, given that Spanish military leadership was of such low quality compared to their German collaborators. In the ground-support sphere, however, it led to improved communications structures. In order to better coordinate attacks, Luftwaffe personnel had to work tirelessly to find ways of jointly planning the air and ground offensives. Besides having to work hard at the command level, the Luftwaffe placed communications and liaison teams at the front lines for better information sharing. Herbert Mason describes these inter-service cooperation lessons as being very beneficial for the later blitzkrieg operations during the Second World War.

Air-ground coordination improved a great deal during the campaign based on the increased effort for managerial efficiency. The informal command link reinforced the obvious need for good air-ground coordination because the Spanish Army was repeatedly unable to follow up after Luftwaffe forward attacks. It was a constant irritation to the German commanders, who became aware of what a well-coordinated attack could accomplish and what innovative information sharing would need to take place to achieve it. Thus in only a year’s time of combat experience in Spain, the Luftwaffe had truly mastered close air support. On the December 29, 1937, they participated in a battle in Teruel, in which they executed excellent forward bombing that allowed the Nationalist ground forces to follow up, then seamlessly switched to bombing of the follow-up Republican reserve forces This battlefield proof of the effectiveness of ground attack led directly to technological innovation; Condor Legion commanders requested the development of heavily armored aircraft made specifically for ground attack. The Henschel and Focke Wulf companies produced the Henschel 129 as a result.

Incentives for the German commanders were naturally based in part on the fact that they were participating in a real conflict, trying to secure a military victory and protect the lives of their troops. Many German officers experiencing the innovative work in Spain later gained valuable promotions, demonstrated by Sperrle’s advancement in 1937 to field marshal of the Luftwaffe, and the promotion of officers Drum, Plocher, Galland, and Seidemann to the rank of general. Von Richthofen later served as a senior commander in most of the major theaters of the war, including Britain and Russia. An example of direct processing of innovation due to command promotion from the Spanish Civil War to the main Luftwaffe force came after evidence of German deficiency in night and bad weather flying. The German accidents resulting from poor visibility crashes had an immediate impact on Condor Legion commanders, and new training practices were immediately implemented. Sperrle in 1937 returned to Germany to become a commander of the Luftwaffe Third Air Fleet, and immediately strengthened the deficient night and bad weather training.

The importance of Sperrle’s promotion should not be underestimated; he later found himself in the position to directly implement exercises and experimentation designed to strengthen CAS practices. Both Sperrle and von Richthofen were two of the very few Luftwaffe officers to achieve the rank of field marshal. In Germany Sperrle ordered Luftwaffe commanders to set up joint war games with Army units, and used his influence to get Army commanders to allow the participation of the Luftwaffe in their own war gaming and exercises. His Luftwaffe officers were not allowed to merely attend these exercises, but had to participate as commanding air officers.

German air power innovation was aided, particularly in the north of Spain, by their opponents’ lack of air power. German Luftwaffe operations in the Basque region of northern Spain were carried out virtually unopposed by enemy aircraft, giving Luftwaffe command the opportunity to execute ground support, bombing and experimental operations at will. The experimental process benefited from the environmentally-constructed high error tolerance. This historical anomaly suggests opportunities for successful innovation can be abundant when competing against a highly inferior enemy. Ineffective opposition led to high error tolerance for experimentation because there was much less chance of penalty for unsuccessful attempts at actions like close air support or use of massed armor. For example, the near-perfect operating conditions for the Stuka dive-bombers, due largely to the ineffectiveness of Spanish anti-aircraft guns against them, led to tactical perfection and large-scale passing on of lessons learned to parent units in Germany.

An alternate source of information was provided by the participation of the Russian military, which committed forces on behalf of the Spanish Republic. The military value of the fighter/bomber was further emphasized for the Germans in March 1937 when Russian-piloted fighter aircraft nearly decimated a motorized corps of Italian troops. The action demonstrated the devastating potential of tactical ground bombardment. These results, in particular, were analyzed by the German command and the international military press.

A unifying military culture occurs when both commanders and sub-units envision the same set of possibilities. This was facilitated by the comprehensive exposure of large numbers of the Luftwaffe to the Condor Legion’s innovations. In the interest of providing combat experience for its officers, over fourteen thousand German personnel of all levels of rank were rotated in and out of Spain, seeing and participating firsthand the new innovations. The rapid production of combat veterans that returned to their units after a year of service in Spain ensured the rapid integration of the new tactics throughout the operating core of the Luftwaffe. The experience had an immense influence on Luftwaffe doctrine, tactics, and technology through its involvement in every type of air campaign. Commanders and managers involved with innovation also infused the Luftwaffe; in addition to Sperrle and von Richthofen, future generals Drum, Plocher, and Seidemann all gained combat experience in the Spanish Civil War. The Luftwaffe gained a command staff experienced in planning and execution of joint land-air combat operations. This heavy exposure to innovation worked the same way as the comprehensive post-War studies of the German Army’s failures and the changes that needed to be made—by saturation through involvement of a large number of officers.

The commitment by the German Army of one armored battalion to the Spanish campaign, under the leadership of the Luftwaffe, provided excellent opportunities for testing blitzkrieg tactics. These opportunities began after the Fascist forces had essentially broken the fixed Nationalist lines and initiated a war of maneuver. In what was considered one of the first true blitzkrieg operations, in 1938 the armored force was able to break through the front lines and make a thirty-six kilometer advance in one day. The Luftwaffe had to make several forward deployments to continue support to the quick-moving armor squadron, gaining valuable experience for future blitzkrieg operations. Many attribute the German experience in the Spanish Civil War as the final field test of the joint doctrinal and operational lessons that had been first introduced at Kazan and Lipetsk.

In 1937 when the German Army held the all-important autumn maneuvers in which blitzkrieg proved itself beyond a doubt, the close air support employed was a direct result of Sperrle’s participation in the Spanish Civil War and the Condor Legion’s experience with blitzkrieg. As Herbert Mason confirms, Condor Legion commander Richthofen—like Sperrle before him—became a passionate supporter of the Luftwaffe’s close air support role in blitzkrieg operations. During the invasion of Poland, Richthofen was so committed to securing the benefits of air and ground cooperation he had learned in Spain that he shared command headquarters with Tenth Army commander von Reichenau. This excellent inter-service cooperation, also learned through dealings with the Spanish officers, facilitated Richthofen’s close air support to Reichenau’s armor during that campaign and was a key element in the next year’s success in France. Indeed, Richthofen’s close air support against the French at Sedan facilitated the crossing of the Meuse and the breakout from the Meuse river bridgeheads on 15 May 1940 by Guderian’s XIX Panzer Corps and the XLI Panzer Corps, the seminal event in the Allied collapse in the West.

In another irony, this German advantage was fleeting. The blitzkrieg successes against Poland and France, going down from the wide to the narrow openings of a funnel, were inverted in the following campaign against the Soviet Union where the German forces traversed the funnel from narrow aperture to wide, dissipating their mass over the vast Russian land mass and stretching their air assets to beyond the breaking point. Strategic mismanagement and over-extension will always trump doctrinal innovation and tactical brilliance.

German Plan for Army Group A

There is documentary evidence that provisional invasion plans were drawn up, and that orders for certain preparations were issued. At the same time there remains considerable controversy as to whether Operation Sea Lion ever amounted to more than a generously resourced bluff - a deception operation on a grand scale. A successful bluff, after all, requires great effort if it is to look like the real thing, and requires the pretence of full preparations. If an enemy is to be deceived, so too must many of the supposed 'participants', in this case including many senior officers in the Wehrmacht and Kreigsmarine. This is not as difficult to achieve as it might sound. Except at the very highest level, confidentiality ensures that even quite senior officers are only aware of the aspects of an operation which directly involve them, and this helps explain how some of the Generals failed to see through the charade, and failed to realise that an invasion could not work. Most simply assumed that other parts of the operation would deal with any difficulties they anticipated.

Preparations for Sea Lion were certainly extensive, and detailed. At least 250 Panzers were modified as amphibious assault vehicles, with water seals and long 'Schnorkels', while the number of horses to be embarked was reduced when Halder decided that his Cavalry would use bicycles instead of horses. Newsreels were even prepared for use in the immediate aftermath of a landing (shot during rehearsals, and convincingly cut with real footage from the Battle of France), while food for the various troops, horses and dogs was gathered. But in the end, this was as much wishful thinking as the plans to deport all British males between 17 and 45 to the Reich, or as the appointments of Nazi bureaucrats to run Britain after a successful invasion. Nor was the planned removal of Nelson's column from London (to be re-erected in "Berlin as a symbol of victory) any more real!

There is a great deal of evidence to support the hypothesis that Hitler never intended to invade Britain at all. Some suggest that the flotilla of barges supposedly assembled for the invasion actually served two purposes. They were primarily assembled as a bluff, but one which could have been turned into reality had circumstances persuaded Hitler (the supreme opportunist) that an invasion could have succeeded. Interestingly, the number of barges assembled in the Channel ports declined steadily after mid-September, dropping from 1004 on 18 September to 691 by the end of the month. Similarly, on 10 September, the first two divisions that had been on standby for Sea Lion quietly moved east. More would soon follow. This was hardly consistent with the build-up prior to an invasion, and conclusively demonstrated that by mid-September, at least, Sea Lion had ceased to be a reality, if it ever had been real at all.

Yet S-Day was eventually scheduled for 21 September, with a final go-ahead date on 11 September. The operation was officially ordered, but was postponed on 17 September. This was, officially at least, a postponement and not a cancellation and preparations and rehearsals continued unabated into October. But on 12 October, General Wilhelm Keitel, the Chief of Staff of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW - Hitler's replacement for the War Ministry), acknowledged that it was now continuing 'only as a means of exerting political and military pressure on England' and that its execution would 'possibly' take place the following year. In the meantime, this 'bluff' had been an expensive one, dramatically slowing down industrial production, producing food shortages at home, and putting at risk the 1941 harvest. Iron ore and coal built up at the Baltic ports, with insufficient barges to transport it to the Ruhr, and even priority programmes (V-boat construction for example) began to slip. Barges were actually converted and crewed for their new role, consuming 75,000 cubic metres of concrete, 30,000 tonnes of iron girders and 40,000 cubic metres of wooden planks, plus 4000 towlines and huge quantities of canvas, chain and armour plate. Huge numbers of former seamen were transferred from the army and Luftwaffe, and the Kreigsmarine mobilised its reserves.

Hitler himself never showed much interest in the planning for Sea Lion, in marked contrast to the planning which had led to the conquests of Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Denmark, Norway, the Low Countries and France. When the Kreigsmarine and Wehrmacht initially produced various invasion studies, Hitler expressly forbade any real preparations, concentrating first on the drive to capture Paris, and then on celebrating his victory. This lack of involvement may have had little significance, since Hitler was very much a land-based military thinker, unable to understand the problems of air and sea power. Those who believe in the reality of Sea Lion use Hitler's land-based thinking to explain that he was thus bound to leave detailed planning in the hands of his subordinates. But others see in this lack of involvement a confirmation that Sea Lion was never more than a 'planning option'. Hitler was, after all, psychologically driven to be directly involved in the planning of all of his great victories.

While Hitler often relied on luck, daring and surprise to 'carry the day', and was often inadequately prepared to meet well-ordered opposition, the Wehrmacht's lack of preparation for an invasion of Britain was in an entirely different league. The Allied D-Day landings took two years to prepare, with huge logistical problems to overcome. Some now ask how, if Hitler ever intended mounting a real invasion, he ever dreamed that he might succeed with so little preparation and planning? Incredible as it may now seem, the complete lack of detail in the Sea Lion plan, and the failure to take account of logistics, opposition and other factors may simply have represented a complete lack of understanding of the scope of the proposed undertaking, and the nature of the English Channel itself. As if to confirm this, a High Command memo compared the proposed operation to a 'river crossing on a broad front'.

But lack of preparation may not have been the main factor in preventing an invasion. After one meeting to discuss invasion plans, General Halder noted in his diary that Hitler 'believes that England must be forced into making peace. The reason: if we destroy England militarily, the British Empire will fall. Germany will gain nothing from this. German blood would have been spilt for Japan, America, and others.' There is no doubt that Hitler had some difficulty in seeing the British people (as opposed to their leaders) as being a natural enemy, and because of this, he had little stomach for a war against (or an invasion of) Britain, particularly while communist Russia was still in existence on his doorstep, so to speak. While Nazi peace overtures were rudely rebuffed by Churchill's government, Hitler still held back from the kind of all-out war against another Aryan nation which an invasion would have represented. He was never quite sure what an invasion of Britain would achieve, and when asked about the invasion plan is quoted as having said 'Let us by all means conquer Britain. But what then, and what for?' Hitler knew that even if an invasion were successful, the effort of holding on to the island nation would prevent him from launching the attack on Russia.

Even if it is accepted that Hitler himself ever seriously contemplated an invasion, there is plenty of evidence that any such plans had been shelved indefinitely long before the Battle of Britain reached its climax. The lack of transport ships, the unsuitability of the Rhine barges commandeered for the operation and the Kreigsmarine's lack of naval superiority cast doubt on the viability of any landing operation. There was little chance that any invasion fleet could have survived the Channel crossing in the face of Royal Navy intervention, and even with air superiority, the Luftwaffe as equipped in 1940 could not have prevented such an intervention.

But whatever Hitler's motivation, and whatever he thought about Sea Lion's prospects, there is little doubt that many in the German High Command never took it seriously. Even after the issue of Fhrer-Direktiv 16, Generals JodI and Jeschonnek remained convinced that there would be no invasion, and profoundly doubted that Germany could actually mount such an operation. Even Goring, fanatically, loyal to Hitler, lacked much faith in the planned invasion. He would probably have enjoyed the opportunity to show off his Luftwaffe, but was always worried that the proposed invasion would not, or could not work, and was astonished and angry to find that his air campaign was subordinated to the needs of the army and navy in the invasion.

Goring remained hungry for glory and prominence, and hoped that his Luftwaffe would make Sea Lion an unnecessary irrelevance by forcing Britain to surrender or sue for peace through bombing alone. His overall concept for an independent air campaign was sensible enough, aiming as it did to probe Britain's defences, then destroy the RAF on the ground and in the air, simultaneously destroying Britain's aircraft industry and attacking harbours and shippIng to cut off vital imports. Goring felt that this campaign in itself could bring Britain to its knees. Goring's total faith in the efficacy of air attacks may now appear to be .profoundly unrealistic, but for anyone schooled in the air power theories of the 1920s, the belief that a war could be won by bombing alone was by no means unusual, and was almost an orthodoxy. In any case, had the Luftwaffe been properly equipped for a true strategic bombing campaign, then perhaps Goring's high expectations would not have been so wide of the mark. But in 1940, the Luftwaffe was a tactical air force, tailored to the needs of army support, and ill-equipped and ill-prepared for autonomous strategic operation.

The successes of the Panzer Divisions were not brought about by tanks alone. It was the ability to combine the actions of Infantry, Armour and Artillery which achieved it. The Panzer Grenadiers provided close support for the tanks throughout the war, and as the numbers of Panzers dwindled the Grenadiers were forced to shoulder more of the burden.

The Panzer Grenadier Battalion seems to have been the subject of more organisational variations than any other manoeuvre unit in the German Army. Matters are complicated further by the deployment of two distinct types of Battalion; the 'Mechanised' unit, which fought from armoured halftracks, and the 'Motorised' which was carried in lorries and field cars. Both formations had similar characteristics, but their fighting potential was notably different. The disagreements between various sources renders any attempt to apply unit strengths meaningless.

The Panzer Grenadier Battalion, circa 1940 to 1942

Battalion Headquarters

Communications Platoon

Battalion Supply and Maintenance elements

Heavy Company

Company HQ

Pioneer Platoon

Anti Tank Platoon

Infantry Gun Platoon

Machine Gun Company

Company HQ

Mortar Platoon

Two Machine Gun Platoons

Three Rifle Companies, each comprising;

Company HQ

Machine Gun Section

Three Rifle Platoons, each comprising;

Platoon HQ (1 Officer or NCO, 6 men)

Three Rifle Squads, each comprised of 12 men

Points of note

At first sight the allocation of support weapons seems quite generous, however it is somewhat deceiving. An Infantry Battalion commander could be reinforced with an Anti Tank and an Infantry Gun Platoon from his Regiment. The Panzer Grenadier Regiment simply deployed its extra assets within the Battalions as a matter of course. During the early years of the war it was not unusual for a Battalion to deploy a single Company in halftracks with the balance in lorries. As production increased, the aim became to fully equip an entire Battalion with the armoured vehicle.

The elements of the Battalion

Battalion Headquarters - the command staff of the Battalion but fully motorised.

Communications Platoon - fulfilled the same role as that in the Infantry Battalion.

Supply and Maintenance units- contained the Battalion motor pool and the various craftsmen and mechanics needed to maintain the collection of men and vehicles.

Pioneer Platoon- the Panzer Grenadier seem to have initially had a standing Pioneer unit, which was charged with assault tasks rather than labouring, as befitted their mobile role. They were equipped with light machine guns and flamethrowers, but numbers of weapons are vague.

Anti Tank Platoon- the original Anti Tank gun was the 3.7 cm Pak. This small lightweight weapon was akin to the British 2 pdr, in that it too was obsolete before hostilities began but due to a lack of replacements was kept in service far beyond its days. The Platoon served three weapons, towed by whatever vehicle was available from the myriad types deployed, the ideal being the Krupp Protz. The 3.7 cm was the standard defence for the early part of the war, and earned the derisory nickname 'the doorknocker' from its inability to penetrate most British and Soviet tanks. Its successor was the more capable 5 cm Pak, which appeared in time to replace some 3.7 cm weapons for the invasion of Russia.

Infantry Gun Platoon - the 7.5 cm Infantry Gun was the primary Regimental support weapon, and the Platoon served two such weapons.

Mortar Platoon - as the Infantry version, with six 8 cm tubes.

Machine Gun Platoon - as the Infantry with four MG34 heavy machine guns.

The Rifle Company- as mentioned the Rifle Company could be transported either by lorry or halftrack. In either event, the same twelve man Squad was used.

It comprised a leader and assistant, armed with a machine pistol and rifle respectively. The four men of the rifle element were each armed with a rifle. The machine gun element deployed two gunners and two loaders, each armed with a pistol, serving a pair of light machine guns. A driver and assistant were responsible for the vehicle. In the halftrack version, the vehicle mounted its own LMG behind a splinter shield. It was the responsibility of the assistant driver to man this weapon. The driver had a rifle, and a 'spare' machine pistol was carried in the vehicle. One of the two LMGs could be placed on a rear mounting enabling it to be used in the anti aircraft role where required. In the lorried Squad there were no additional weapons in the vehicle, both driver and assistant carrying a rifle. The concentration of light machine guns was enormous for such a small unit. The driver and assistant would remain with the vehicle (though with the lorry there was only need for the driver to stay). The dismount troops could split into two teams, each with a leader, two riflemen and gun team. This negated the weakness of riflemen covering a moving MG team with clunky bolt action weapons. The three Squads operated under a Platoon Headquarters. The halftrack version comprised a Platoon commander, NCO, two messengers, driver, medic and motorcycle orderly. The motorised equivalent was split between two Kubelwagens and so substituted a second driver for the motorcycle rider. Commanders carried machine pistols, medics pistols, all others rifle.

Uniquely, an attempt was made to provide anti tank guns to each halftrack Platoon by mounting a 3.7 cm Pak on the commander's vehicle in place of a LMG. As a means of tank defence it was mostly outdated, but it offered a handy means of projecting fire in support of the Squads. The issue of 5 cm mortars and Anti Tank Rifles in the early years is hazy. Each Company had three of each weapons, but whether they were deployed by the Platoons or served by dedicated men at Company level remains a mystery, to me at least. Anyone know?

Company HQ added the traditional command, supply and additionally maintenance elements.

The mid-war period

During 1943 the same reductions inflicted upon the Infantry arm were also visited upon the Panzer Grenadiers. Again, specific details are confused, but the overall effect is clear.

The Machine Gun Company was abolished, and its assets were distributed to the Rifle Companies, each of which now added a Weapons Platoon to its ranks. Heavy Company lost its Pioneer Platoon, but there were such assets at Regimental level to compensate. Some sources describe an Anti Tank Section within each Rifle Company, serving four 8.8 cm Projectors. The most important move was towards deploying at least one Mechanised Battalion in each Panzer Division. Panzer Grenadier Divisions were left motorised only it appears. By 1944 the picture had settled somewhat.

The Panzer Grenadier Battalion, circa 1944

Battalion Headquarters

Communications Platoon

Battalion Supply and Maintenance elements

Heavy Company

Company HQ

Motorised Battalion

Heavy Mortar Platoon

Anti Aircraft Platoon

Anti Tank Platoon * credited in some sources to the Battalion, but possibly attached from a Regimental AT Company

Mechanised Battalion

Heavy Mortar Platoon

Infantry Gun Platoon

Three Rifle Companies, each comprised of;

Company HQ

Weapons Platoon, comprised of;

Platoon HQ

Two Machine Gun Sections

Mortar Section

Anti Aircraft Section * Mechanised only

Infantry Gun Section * Mechanised only

Three Rifle Platoons, each comprised of

Platoon HQ (1 Officer or NCO, 6 men)

Three Rifle Squads, each comprised of 10 men Mechanised or 12 men Motorised

Points of note

The firepower of the Mechanised formation had been massively increased. Curiously, the Motorised Battalion had lost its 7.5 cm Infantry guns, but these may have been retained in those units which did not receive the 12 cm mortar to replace them. Anti aircraft weapons were now a prime requirement for the ground troops, as the Luftwaffe's decline allowed allied planes to roam at will overhead.

The elements of the Battalion

Heavy Mortar Platoon - as with the Infantry, the Panzer Grenadiers were authorised four 12 cm mortars carried by tracked lorries of halftracks.

Anti Aircraft Platoon- the AA Platoon served six 2 cm weapons which were ideally mounted on trucks or unarmoured halftracks, or towed. They also served in the ground support role as 'very heavy' machine guns.

Anti Tank Platoon- where present this unit was intended to field three 7.5 cm Pak anti tank guns. The 7.5 cm was the next evolution of the German series, and was perhaps the best all round weapon. The guns could be towed or mounted on any of the numerous vehicles used as a firing platform.

Infantry Gun Platoon - in the Mechanised Company this unit comprised six halftracks each mounting a 7.5 cm gun with ammunition vehicles in support.

The Rifle Company- the Motorised Company seems to have undergone little restructuring. The Weapons Platoon served four heavy machine guns and two 8 cm mortars. Other than that, it remained as before.

The Mechanised Company however was very different. Each Squad had lost two men from the rifle element. The Platoon vehicle was now intended to be armed with a 2 cm anti aircraft gun, but this was by no means a universal arrangement. The motorcycle had long since gone and the rider now served on the carrier as a loader or gunner. The Weapons Platoon deployed two 8 cm mortars, each carried and fired from their own halftrack; likewise two 7.5 cm infantry guns. The anti aircraft group should have had three halftracks mounting 2 cm weapons. Each vehicle also carried a heavy machine gun team, yet the Company is credited with four HMGs. Where the fourth team was deployed is one of the many minor mysteries concerning the Panzer Grenadiers. The Platoon commander's vehicle was later deleted. Company HQ is also variously credited with a further 2 cm AA gun halftrack. No official tables credit 8.8 cm anti tank Projectors, the lethal German equivalent of the Bazooka, to the Panzer Grenadiers in 1944. Some sources suggest each halftrack may have been so equipped, but the total is purely speculative.

A flurry of revised tables were issued during the closing months of the war, aimed at increasing AA defence or centralising mortars and machine guns in support companies. I do not propose to attempt to cover them here for sanity's sake, and the fact that they were probably little more than paper formations.

Summary

Quite how closely Panzer Grenadier formations resembled their authorised tables differed on a day to day basis. But where they approached full strength, they were powerful units. As the war progressed they became less mobile, debilitated by lack of fuel and vehicles, pounded from on high by allied bombers, and supported by dwindling numbers of Panzers. In the end, they were reduced to the same stubborn defensive actions as their foot slogging comrades in the Infantry.

By Peter N. Stearns

Fascist movements took shape initially in the 1920s, building on new kinds of conservative attacks on modern society before World War I. In some respects, the movements were blatantly anti-Western, despite their popularity in countries that seemed central to the West. They attacked individualism in the name of group loyalty, the state, and a single leader. They blasted parliaments for their political divisions and their constraints on strong government initiatives. They criticized modern consumerism, modern art, and the changes in women's roles, urging a return to real or imagined folk forms and female domesticity and childbearing. Ultimately, fascism, combined with weak response from the remaining democracies, introduced another set of horrors to 20th century Western history, bringing another world war and the unprecedented slaughter of six million Jews, plus many others, in the Nazi Holocaust.

How could this happen in Western civilization? Aside from a head-in-the- sand wish that the 20th century would go away, there have been two principal interpretive responses. The first emphasizes the extent to which the leading fascist countries, and particularly Germany, were not in fact really Western, despite their undeniable participation in many aspects of Western history and numerous contributions, from music to the modern university, to Western life. Nazism, according to this line of argument, springs from Germanness, not Westernness.

A great deal of research went into a search for a German Sonderweg, or special way, to explain how a society could go so wrong. All of the Sonderweg analysis went beyond the special circumstances Germany faced after 1918, which everyone acknowledges played a key role in spurring Nazism: defeat in war after the government had kept Germans hopeful that victory was near; the fact that the military leadership made a new civilian government take responsibility for the peace settlement, which tainted the regime even though it had not had anything to do with the conduct of war; a terrible price inflation in the early 1920s (for which the government did bear some responsibility, but which really unsettled the middle classes by pounding down the value of savings); a bad peace settlement which stripped Germany of key territory, severely limited the military which made both leaders and veterans all the more disgruntled, and also treated the nation as if it had been solely at fault for the war, imposing heavy reparations which further damaged the economy; and a depression which, partly because of the war's consequences, hit Germany unusually hard after 1919. None of this, according to Sonderweg analysis, quite explains why so many Germans could voluntarily fall for such a horrible political movement (at a peak in free elections in 1932, about 37% of all voters picked the Nazis) and then stay largely silent under a regime that became still more horrible as time went on.

Here are the main features of Germany's special historical path, and, of course, they can be combined with each other as well as with the war and postwar dislocation. In politics, the Prussian state had traditionally emphasized strong authority and a large army. Germany had long been disunited, and then between 1864 and 1871 gained unity by war. All of this increased nationalism more than was usual in Europe (so the argument goes) and linked it to militarism and a strong state. National success weakened the middle-class commitment to liberalism, for liberals accepted a fairly weak parliament, including the emperor's appointment of the executive ministers along with limits on the freedom of the press, because they were so excited about unity. When Germany did get full parliamentary institutions after World War I, in the Weimar republic, it did not have a strong enough liberal tradition to provide adequate support. Late unity also caused a pervasive sense that the other great European powers were not giving Germany its due, for example in imperialism, so when the war settlement punished Germany directly resentment was greater than it might otherwise have been. All of which, in turn, made a vigorously authoritarian, militaristic political movement that promised a glorious foreign policy unusually attractive.

Culturally, some have argued that Germans - particularly, Lutheran Germans - had a distinctively internal idea of freedom, which could make them feel free even under an authoritarian state. Again, this points to weak liberalism. Socially, Germany had an unusually powerful landed aristocracy, the Prussian Junkers, who wanted a state that would maintain their social and economic prestige. Though not for the most part Nazi, they accepted Nazism because it secretly pledged a defense of aristocratic privilege. Under the Junkers, many peasants had long lacked much freedom, which may have made them, too, quick to support a nationalist movement that promised a defense of peasant values against modern life. (Nazis were big on promoting peasant costumes and such.) Germany had industrialized very fast and created a powerful big business class that often allied with the Junkers. Overall, German society had not kept pace with its economy. One result, besides traditionalist peasants, was a large artisan and shopkeeper class that resented modern economic forms, like the department store, which threatened growing competition; again, Nazism, which promised to restore artisan guilds though it largely broke its promise in favor of promoting big business and a war economy, could seem a solution to a society under systematic stress even before World War I. Germany's social structure was simply less flexible than France's or England's, and rapid industrialization was all the more disruptive.

And so Germany was not really Western, which makes a clearly anti-Western political movement and regime unsurprising without calling Western civilization directly into account. The Western nations are still responsible for their timid, sluggish response to Nazism, until World War II forced their hand, but at least Nazism itself is not laid at the Western door. There are a few holes in the Sonderweg analysis: notably, Prussia, where strong government and weak peasants had their greatest hold, was not a hotbed of Nazism compared, for example, to Catholic regions such as Bavaria. But lots of really thoughtful scholars, German and non-German, have poured great intelligence and historical insight into the search for a special explanation.

But Sonderweg analysis has declined in popularity in recent years, mainly, of course, because Germany now seems thoroughly Western and the pressure of explaining Nazism and its atrocities is far less acute. (Historical thinking is always susceptible to the impact of current conditions, and this is one of the factors involved here; the Sonderweg interest may have dropped more than it should as a result.) Far more work now sees Germany's history as fairly similar to that of its neighbors, its social structure, for example, quite comparable to that of France. But this might mean, of course, that Nazism has more to do with the West than some observers might wish.

While Nazism was unusually powerful and awful, strong fascist, anti- Jewish movements cropped up in many parts of the West after World War I - particularly, of course, in Italy (though the anti-Jewish part came only later) and France. Fascism did not win out in France but fascistic movements sometimes had as many as two million supporters; and France's wartime regime, though partly imposed by the Germans after the French defeat, had fascist elements. Spain also picked up fascism, though partly on the strength of German example. To be sure, fascism was weak in Britain, Scandinavia, and the settler societies including the United States, where among other things the parliamentary tradition was unusually strong. But maybe it was in fact Western, and not simply a German aberration.

And here is how this possibility might play out. Fascism was anti-Western in many ways but it highlighted several Western features, taking them out of full context. Notably, it emphasized a strong state as absolutism had done, though going much further in part because, with industrialization and the World War I example, governments could be much more powerful than absolutists had ever imagined save in rhetoric. Fascism strongly played up fervent nationalism, which was a Western creation. It built on a tradition of anti-Semitism that went back to the Middle Ages. And a fascination with military virtues and military competitions was as old as the West itself, and all the fascist movements played on this tradition. So a real Western component was there.

Then, fascism also built on the shock of World War I and a wider sense that industrial society needed to be brought under greater control, to protect older values and social groups. Germany was not alone here. Many sectors - the military, the aristocracy, and in places like Spain the church - were willing to use new, desperate measures to preserve their social power, and fascism could suit the bill. Fear of communism added into this mix - and many non-fascist Westerners shared this fear in the 1920s and 1930s.

Germany went to extremes, but this is because of the war and postwar dislocations, and also because of Hitler's particular evil genius, not because Germany was non-Western. Other regions moved in similar directions. The West is not off the hook. Even at the time, thoughtful observers, such as the novelist Sinclair Lewis in the United States with his book It Can't Happen Here, worried that fascism could spread more widely in the West. Even after World War II fears of revived fascism have troubled not only Germans and Italians, but also French observers and others. No one would argue that fascism was typically Western or some logical outgrowth of Western history; but there may be more link than is sometimes recognized. In extreme circumstances, in other words, the West harbors its own opponents. And while events in the past 50 years have greatly eased fears of fascist recurrence, it may be that the memory not only of the movement, but of its links to Western civilization, is worth maintaining, to warn Westerners of their own dark side.