The Luftwaffe, the newest of the military services, was the least professional and suffered the most from promotions not based on merit. Göring surrounded himself with advisers whose principal qualifications were that they were Nazis, as opposed to experienced aviation military officers. Many times they either offered poor advice or, not wishing to anger him, agreed with whatever ideas he developed. Increasingly, Göring, who held numerous offices in the Reich, largely abandoned his command of the Luftwaffe, intervening only in fits and starts and often with disastrous results, as during the 1940 Battle of Britain. During the war, the Luftwaffe was also the agency least conscious of communications security.

The Luftwaffe controlled all air services but had little interest in naval aviation. Airborne troops were Luftwaffe personnel, and the air force also had charge of antiaircraft artillery. Eventually the Luftwaffe even fielded 22 ground divisions, including the Hermann Göring Armored Division. The Luftwaffe itself was organized into Luftflotten (air fleets), constituted so as to perform a variety of roles and consisting of a wide variety of aircraft types. At the beginning of the war, Germany had four Luftflotten, and during the course of the conflict three more were added. The next operational division was the Fleigerkorps (flier corps), and below that was the Fleigerdivision (flier division). These last two each contained several Geschwader (squadrons) that were designated as to types (including fighters, bombers, night fighters, training, and so on). Each division controlled three to four Gruppen (groups) comprising three or four Staffein (squadrons). In September 1939, the Luftwaffe had 302 Staffein.

At that point, Germany’s chief advantage was in the air, for at the start of hostilities the Luftwaffe was certainly the world’s most powerful air force. In September 1939, Göring commanded more than 3,600 frontline aircraft. The death in 1936 of strategic bomber proponent General Walther Wever, however, had brought a shift in emphasis to tactical air power. This remained the case throughout the war. Although Germany developed four-engine bomber prototypes, these were never placed in production. It could be argued, however, that a tactical air force was the best use of Germany’s limited resources.

The German air force was essentially built to support ground operations. It suited ideally the new blitzkrieg tactics, and the Junkers Ju-87 Stuka dive-bomber was a highly accurate form of “flying artillery.” Impressed by U.S. Marine Corps experiments with precision dive-bombing, the Germans embraced this technique; indeed, all German bombers had to be capable of dive-bombing. This entailed considerable aircraft structural change with attendant production delays and a decrease in bomb-carrying capacity. The flying weight of the Junkers Ju-88 twin-engine bomber went from 6 to 12 tons, sharply reducing both its speed and its bomb-carrying capacity. Nonetheless, the Germans developed some exceptional aircraft. In addition to the Stuka, they had a superb air superiority fighter in the Messerschmitt Bf-109, certainly one of the best all-around aircraft of the war.

The Germans did not have numerical or technological superiority over their opponents. Against Adolf Hitler’s 136 divisions (2.5 million men), the French, British, Belgians, and Dutch could field 135 divisions (more than 2 million men). The Allies and neutral powers also had more tanks (perhaps 3,600, compared with 2,500 for the Germans). The Allies were sadly deficient, however, in numbers of antiaircraft guns and aircraft. Against 1,444 German bombers, the Allies could send up only 830 fighters. These would have to cope with 1,264 German fighter aircraft, more than 1,000 of which were Bf-109s. Overall, the German air fleets deployed in the west numbered 3,226 combat aircraft, whereas the British and French had half that number.

The German army and air force displayed ingenuity and adaptability in the invasion of the Low Countries. In the heart of Rotterdam, Heinkel float planes landed infantry which paddled ashore in inflatable boats.

Infantry-carrying gliders had been towed behind transport planes to land on the roof of Belgium's titanic Eben Emael fortress. On the Luxembourg frontier, German soldiers posing as tourists and dressed in civilian clothes went ahead of the main force to disconnect the demolition devices. The invaders used Dutch uniforms and an armoured train to take the bridge at Gennep. Parachute troops came tumbling out of the sky to seize the mile long undefended bridges at Moerdijk.

Three-engined Junkers airliners crammed with infantry were crash-landed on Dutch roads.

Most of this 'exotica' was used against the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Belgium by the Germans of Army Group B. There was not very much of it and its actual contribution was small. These gimmicks were not a portent of wars to come, they were a stage conjuror's trick to hold the attention of the audience while Army Group A brought the rabbit from the Ardennes woodlands.

Although Germany had overrun France and northwestern Europe rather swiftly in the spring of 1940, its victory was by no means one-sided. The Luftwaffe had committed about 1,000 first-line fighters to the campaign, while the Allies between them had nearly as many. Allied losses were heavy, including aircraft abandoned during the hasty Allied retreat. These losses included about 65 Spitfires, 350 Hurricanes, and 300 DeWoitine 520s (a very good French fighter quite literally just coming off the assembly line during the battle). But the Luftwaffe also took a beating, with nearly 500 Messerschmitt fighters lost, plus many bombers. Pilot losses on both sides had also been serious. Moreover, in an inspired moment, the RAF shipped German pilot prisoners to Great Britain, thereby removing them from the war permanently.

The Luftwaffe played key roles in the German victories over Poland in 1939 and over France and the Low Countries in 1940. Its limitations first became evident during the Battle of Britain, when Göring attempted to wage a strategic bombing campaign with a tactical air force. Germany’s defeat in this battle was its first setback of the war.

Tents only in the desert.

The Jagdwaffe in late 1942 only had a few battle-worn aircraft at their disposal.

If You check the records of the GenQu 6 Abt at BA/MA, and look at the amount of aircraft delivered to the Jagdwaffe (parts of JG 27, JG 53 and JG 77) in the North African theatre, You will find that they received Bf 109G's in the hundreds during the autumn 1942.

For example:

I./JG 77 got 41 brand new G-2/trop when they were transferring to Africa in Sept/Oct 1942.

During the last two months of 42 they lost about 33 aircraft in total, and got 21, ending up with a strength of 25 G-2 trop at the end of the year (and then they got 17 new G-2 trops in January 1943 also)

The picture is similar for III. Gruppe JG 77.

Another fighter unit in the North Africa was II./JG 53. In the period October 1942 through February 1943 they received 125! Brand new Bf 109G-4/trop

I./JG 27 received 32 G2's and 29 G4's from October 1942 to February 1943.

II./JG 27 was the worst off, they had to take over F-4's from other reequipping Gruppen, but nonetheless received a total of about 60 aircraft during the same period, undoubtedly of mixed condition, but good enough to fly.

III./JG 27 was also at the bottom of the ladder it seems.

However, the established strength of these units comprised until VERY late in 1942 (I am then talking turn of the year), was usually above 25 aircraft per Gruppe.

Many of the following, at the time members of JG 27 with scores ranging from a handful to between fifty and a hundred claims up to the period we are discussing:

Sawallisch, Sinner, Rödel, Krenz, Steis, Schöfböck, Stigler, Steis, Homuth, Monska, Besch, Kientsch, Bendert, Rosenberg, Franzisket, Gläser, Scheib, Hoffmann, Gruber, Krainik, Düllberg, Schneider, Jürgens, Werfft, Unterberger, Stahlschmidt, Körner, Schroer, Steinhauser, Lieres und Wilkau, Kügelbauer, Schulze, Heidel, Boerngen, Kaiser, Vögl, Heinecke, Clade, Kabisch. And of course it could not be the less known (at the time) Brandl, Hanbeck, Döring, Dietz, Jansen or Stückler.

The loss of morale in I./J.G. 27 is valid. It was no doubt a combination of combat fatigue and the loss of senior pilots, Marseille, Stahlschmidt, and Steinhausen, that saw the Gruppe in October 1942. But don't attribute the withdrawal too much simply to Marseille, because the Gruppe had seen 17 months of continuous combat, which was surely significant. Perhaps we can consider Marseille's death the final straw.

As for lack of aircraft for the Luftwaffe in North Africa, yes, this was becoming a problem in October and November 1942 in Egypt, but it was certainly not bringing operations to a standstill. On 21 March 1942, when the Axis supply system was almost at its best, there were 159 Luftwaffe sorties in North Africa, on 6 September 1942 there were 130, and on 22 October 1942 there were 142.

To look at it simply in terms of number of aircraft available:

Luftwaffe Aircraft Strength in North Africa

17.01.42 168

04.04.42 169

10.06.42 233

20.08.42 266

20.10.42 241

What should be noted is that the DAF was consistently getting bigger, and was getting more aircraft with greater performance, notably the Spitfire.

Regarding the idea that the Luftwaffe in North Africa was dependent on a few ace pilots, I calculated that between February and 23 October 1942, the top ten Luftwaffe aces claimed 424 of the 930 victories in North Africa. To me, that indicates an over-reliance on a few pilots.

Let's not also forget that regardless of how many planes the JG's had on hand, the German effort still had to deal with issues of fuel, spares, serviceability and the fact that the Allies were either bombing the crap out their landing grounds or attacking their lines of supply almost at will; regardless of how many planes the JGs had on hand, the question is how many could they put in the air.

When dealing with the death of Marseille, Shores and Ring state that September 1942 had been a very bad month for I/JG27, three of the unit's most successful pilots having been killed. (Presumably this includes Marseille himself.) That would certainly weaken the unit's experience level.

Evidence of the operations of the remaining three Jagdgruppe in this period suggests that they regularly operated in small numbers, and could only assemble any significant number by combining elements from all three units. This is entirely consistent with units at the end of a long and troubled supply line, having difficulty maintaining serviceability.

Luftwaffe losses on the ground in North Africa, February - 23 October 1942

To bombing: 64 aircraft destroyed, 89 aircraft damaged To special forces: 37 aircraft destroyed, 19 aircraft damaged Total: 101 destroyed, 108 damaged.

These figures are far from complete, but are all accounted for in German records.

Serviceability is also an important issue. The Luftwaffe in North Africa was always behind the DAF in this regard. The DAF consistently maintained serviceability of 70-75%, while the Fliegerführer Afrika never rose above 67%.

Fliegerführer Afrika Serviceability

17.01.42 - 51.7

04.04.42 - 50.2

10.05.42 - 67.3

10.06.42 - 61.3

27.07.42 - 54.3

20.08.42 - 60.1

20.10.42 - 53.5

By Andrew Arthy