The Luftwaffe Jagdwaffe in North Africa in 1942.

Tents only in the desert.

The Jagdwaffe in late 1942 only had a few battle-worn aircraft at their disposal.

If You check the records of the GenQu 6 Abt at BA/MA, and look at the amount of aircraft delivered to the Jagdwaffe (parts of JG 27, JG 53 and JG 77) in the North African theatre, You will find that they received Bf 109G's in the hundreds during the autumn 1942.

For example:

I./JG 77 got 41 brand new G-2/trop when they were transferring to Africa in Sept/Oct 1942.

During the last two months of 42 they lost about 33 aircraft in total, and got 21, ending up with a strength of 25 G-2 trop at the end of the year (and then they got 17 new G-2 trops in January 1943 also)

The picture is similar for III. Gruppe JG 77.

Another fighter unit in the North Africa was II./JG 53. In the period October 1942 through February 1943 they received 125! Brand new Bf 109G-4/trop

I./JG 27 received 32 G2's and 29 G4's from October 1942 to February 1943.

II./JG 27 was the worst off, they had to take over F-4's from other reequipping Gruppen, but nonetheless received a total of about 60 aircraft during the same period, undoubtedly of mixed condition, but good enough to fly.

III./JG 27 was also at the bottom of the ladder it seems.

However, the established strength of these units comprised until VERY late in 1942 (I am then talking turn of the year), was usually above 25 aircraft per Gruppe.

Many of the following, at the time members of JG 27 with scores ranging from a handful to between fifty and a hundred claims up to the period we are discussing:

Sawallisch, Sinner, Rödel, Krenz, Steis, Schöfböck, Stigler, Steis, Homuth, Monska, Besch, Kientsch, Bendert, Rosenberg, Franzisket, Gläser, Scheib, Hoffmann, Gruber, Krainik, Düllberg, Schneider, Jürgens, Werfft, Unterberger, Stahlschmidt, Körner, Schroer, Steinhauser, Lieres und Wilkau, Kügelbauer, Schulze, Heidel, Boerngen, Kaiser, Vögl, Heinecke, Clade, Kabisch. And of course it could not be the less known (at the time) Brandl, Hanbeck, Döring, Dietz, Jansen or Stückler.

The loss of morale in I./J.G. 27 is valid. It was no doubt a combination of combat fatigue and the loss of senior pilots, Marseille, Stahlschmidt, and Steinhausen, that saw the Gruppe in October 1942. But don't attribute the withdrawal too much simply to Marseille, because the Gruppe had seen 17 months of continuous combat, which was surely significant. Perhaps we can consider Marseille's death the final straw.

As for lack of aircraft for the Luftwaffe in North Africa, yes, this was becoming a problem in October and November 1942 in Egypt, but it was certainly not bringing operations to a standstill. On 21 March 1942, when the Axis supply system was almost at its best, there were 159 Luftwaffe sorties in North Africa, on 6 September 1942 there were 130, and on 22 October 1942 there were 142.

To look at it simply in terms of number of aircraft available:

Luftwaffe Aircraft Strength in North Africa

17.01.42 168

04.04.42 169

10.06.42 233

20.08.42 266

20.10.42 241

What should be noted is that the DAF was consistently getting bigger, and was getting more aircraft with greater performance, notably the Spitfire.

Regarding the idea that the Luftwaffe in North Africa was dependent on a few ace pilots, I calculated that between February and 23 October 1942, the top ten Luftwaffe aces claimed 424 of the 930 victories in North Africa. To me, that indicates an over-reliance on a few pilots.

Let's not also forget that regardless of how many planes the JG's had on hand, the German effort still had to deal with issues of fuel, spares, serviceability and the fact that the Allies were either bombing the crap out their landing grounds or attacking their lines of supply almost at will; regardless of how many planes the JGs had on hand, the question is how many could they put in the air.

When dealing with the death of Marseille, Shores and Ring state that September 1942 had been a very bad month for I/JG27, three of the unit's most successful pilots having been killed. (Presumably this includes Marseille himself.) That would certainly weaken the unit's experience level.

Evidence of the operations of the remaining three Jagdgruppe in this period suggests that they regularly operated in small numbers, and could only assemble any significant number by combining elements from all three units. This is entirely consistent with units at the end of a long and troubled supply line, having difficulty maintaining serviceability.

Luftwaffe losses on the ground in North Africa, February - 23 October 1942

To bombing: 64 aircraft destroyed, 89 aircraft damaged To special forces: 37 aircraft destroyed, 19 aircraft damaged Total: 101 destroyed, 108 damaged.

These figures are far from complete, but are all accounted for in German records.

Serviceability is also an important issue. The Luftwaffe in North Africa was always behind the DAF in this regard. The DAF consistently maintained serviceability of 70-75%, while the Fliegerführer Afrika never rose above 67%.

Fliegerführer Afrika Serviceability

17.01.42 - 51.7

04.04.42 - 50.2

10.05.42 - 67.3

10.06.42 - 61.3

27.07.42 - 54.3

20.08.42 - 60.1

20.10.42 - 53.5

By Andrew Arthy