The German Infantry and Grenadier Battalion

The German Infantry Battalion underwent a seemingly constant series of changes and reorganisations during the war, beginning in 1939 and peaking in 1944/45. The overall structure of the Battalion remained largely unaltered; Battalion Headquarters with Communications and Trains elements, a Machine Gun or Heavy Company, and three Rifle Companies. Each amendment reduced the establishment of the Battalion, but sought to alleviate the effect through increased automatic firepower.

In 1942, in belated recognition of the role they had played, the Infantryman was renamed Grenadier. It was nothing more than a PR move, and most men would have gladly been called 'Doris' in return for some effective anti tank defence on the Eastern Front.

The Infantry Battalion, circa 1940 to 1942

Battalion Headquarters (5 Officers, 27 men)

Communications Platoon (22 men)

Battalion Supply Train (32 men)

Machine Gun Company (3 Officers, 174 men)

Company HQ (1 Officer, 16 men)

Company Train (31 men)

Mortar Platoon (1 Officer, 53 men)

Three Machine Gun Platoons (1 Officer or NCO, 24 men)

Three Rifle Companies (2 Officers, 197 men), each comprised of;

Company HQ (1 Officer, 10 men)

Company Supply Train (31 men)

Anti Tank Rifle Section (7 men)

Three Rifle Platoons, each comprised of;

Platoon HQ (1 Officer or NCO, 6 men)

Light Mortar Section (3 men)

Four Rifle Squads, each comprised of 10 men

Total Strength of 860 all ranks (14 Officers and 846 men)* The source this is taken from is not presented in the normal tabulated manner, so some 'interpretation' is unfortunately required.

Points of note

The German Battalion never gathered its overall command and service elements into a HQ Company, as did the British and Americans. Another interesting omission is a Pioneer Platoon. In practice, each Battalion selected a number of men within the Platoons to be trained in the role. They were detached from their units and assembled as and when required. Also, Infantry Battalions were never authorised their own Anti Tank Guns, such weapons remaining firmly under Regimental control. The most notable feature is the lower number of commissioned officers in the Battalion. Only the first Platoon of each Company was commanded by an Officer, the second and third being lead by Senior NCOs. Likewise, Company commanders had no deputy, that role falling to the officer in first Platoon. I believe it was a unique approach. Many allied platoons were lead by Sergeants, but only because their Officer had fallen. The troops undoubtedly performed well under their NCOs, but perhaps the absence of more empowered leaders compounded the 'die in your foxhole' mentality that characterised later defensive operations.

The elements of the Battalion

Battalion Headquarters - Comprised the Battalion Commander, two Adjutants, Medical Officer, Veterinarian and a small staff of runners and clerks.

Communications Platoon - maintained radio, wire and telephone communication between the Battalion and higher and parallel formations.

Battalion Supply Train - contained the Battalion's small motor pool, large numbers of horse drawn wagons and also the usual tradesmen and specialists.

Heavy Company HQ - administered the units of the Heavy Company.

The Mortar Platoon- the Mortar Platoon was much like any other. It deployed six teams each serving a single 8 cm mortar with a range of almost 2400 m. What stands out in all allied reports is the ferocity and accuracy of the bombardment they produced. Perhaps this was partly due to an increased allocation of such weapons later in the war (discussed further on), but they undoubtedly provided the Battalion commander with his most powerful asset.

The Machine Gun Platoon - the German Army had learned well the lessons taught by the machine gun on the killings fields of the Great War. But they did not rely on the self same weapons for the next conflict, as was the case with the allies. The MG34 was a unique concept; a General Purpose Machine Gun or GPMG. The same weapon could be mounted on a heavy tripod and fed by continuous belts of ammunition, or fired from a bipod with a short belt contained in a drum. The toll this weapon and its successor took on allied troops was truly terrible. Each Platoon served four MG34s, used in the sustained fire mode on tripod mountings.

The Rifle Company- the original Company formation fielded by the Infantry was particularly large. The building block was the Rifle Squad or Gruppe.

Each Squad was comprised of an NCO, a six man rifle element and a three man machine gun element. The NCO was originally armed with a rifle, but as sufficient stocks became available adopted the MP40 machine pistol. The MP40 was the world's first mass produced sub machine gun, and was constructed from pre-fabricated metal stampings and plastic. It fired the usual 9 mm round, and became a highly sought after allied trophy. Some one million were eventually produced. The men of the rifle group were all armed with the Mauser bolt action rifle, an amended model of the 1898 weapon fielded during the Great War. One of the riflemen served as assistant leader. Like the British, the Germans based the firepower of the squad around a single light machine gun. The MG34 was served by a gunner and loader, each man armed with a pistol; a third ammunition bearer carried a rifle. The original weapon was the revolutionary MG34. The Germans believed a gunner would only have seconds to engage exposed enemy infantry before they naturally took cover. The MG34 had an exceptionally high rate of fire for the period, enabling even the shortest burst to unleash a tremendous volley.

The German penchant for large headquarters elements began at Platoon level. The four squads were directed by a Platoon commander aided by an NCO, three runners, a medic and a supply wagon driver. The commander, who as mentioned previously may have been an officer or senior NCO, was armed with a machine pistol and a semi automatic pistol. His NCO and runners carried rifles, as did the wagon driver, while the medic carried a pistol. The wagon driver was responsible for the Platoon supply vehicle, a horse drawn affair which transported the bulk of the unit's equipment. I'm not aware of any other army which provided transport down to this level, even if it was as low tech as a horse and cart. The light mortar section was the same as the British equivalent, an NCO with gunner and loader. The NCO carried a rifle, each crewman a pistol. The 5 cm light mortar was not a popular weapon. Unlike the British, who used the 2 inch mortar more for smoke than effect, the Germans intended the 5 cm to bridge the gap between maximum grenade range and minimum safe artillery range. It was not a success, being too heavy a weapon for too small an advantage. It fell out of use quickly once the campaign in the East began.

Company HQ provided the usual command functions. The supply role was handled by the substantial Company Train, which included a large number of horse drawn vehicles, but originally also three trucks. Company level fire support was provided by the Anti Tank Rifle section. Its NCO commanded three teams, each of a gunner and loader serving a single Panzerbuchse 38/39. The ATR was, as mentioned in the British pages, an outmoded idea from a previous era. The ironic reality was that many Infantry units did not even have the rifles until the invasion of Russia, in which theatre of war they were infinitely outclassed. But, as in the British and Red armies, they remained in use long after they should have to provide the infantry soldier with some means to engage armour in the absence of the necessary towed guns.

The mid-war period

1942 and 1943 were dark times for the average German soldier. Yet defeat in North Africa and allied landings in Italy were probably of little consequence to those engaged in the East. In an effort to meet the needs for war against the mammoth Red Army, the Wehrmacht had been massively expanded, but it was becoming plain the army was too big to support. Reductions were sought to ameliorate the crippling losses already sustained. They fell on all branches, but the Infantry were hit the hardest.

Little detail is available on the interim reorganisation which laid the ground for the 1944 Battalion detailed subsequently. Several amendments are certain. During 1943, the Rifle Platoon lost its fourth Squad. Platoon HQ had already deleted the light mortar section, and Company HQ the Anti Tank Rifle section. The ponderous Company train was also reduced, and most importantly lost its motor vehicles. The issue of support weapons causes particular confusion. A Rifle Company was now stated as having sixteen MG34s and two 8 cm mortars. The Support Company had twelve MG34s in the heavy role, and six 8 cm mortars. The issue of light machine guns is odd. It would suggest that each Platoon had a fifth weapon, perhaps used to replace the 5 cm mortar. With the deletion of the fourth Squad, their LMG seems to have remained, suggesting two unallocated weapons at Platoon HQ? The remaining weapon would then have been carried by the Train, who were increasingly required to take on a fighting role. The issue of 8 cm mortars to each company is likewise odd; each Section would have needed a substantial crew and horse drawn transport element, and there seems little reward in duplicating the Platoon in Support Company. Perhaps they were served by the crews of the redundant light mortars and ATRs? An alternative arrangement describes the Mortar Platoon being split between the Rifle Companies, and an Infantry Gun Platoon (usually found at Regimental level) serving two 7.5 cm guns taking its place in Support Company. There are several versions and variations described for the late 1943 period, most contradictory, all vague. By 1944 the Army had penned a new organisation which sought to further reduce manpower but attempted to increase automatic firepower in compensation.

The Grenadier Battalion, 1944

Battalion Headquarters (4 Officers, 13 men)

Communications Platoon (25 men)

Battalion Supply Train (35 men)

Heavy Company (3 Officers, 202 men)

Company HQ (1 Officer, 19 men)

Company Train (17 men)

Machine Gun Platoon (1 Officer, 54 men)

8 cm Mortar Platoon (66 men)

12 cm Mortar Platoon (1 Officer, 46 men)

Three Rifle Companies (2 Officers, 140 men), each comprised of;

Company HQ (1 Officer, 11 men)

Company Supply Train (13 men)

Machine Gun Section (18 men)

Three Rifle Platoons, each comprised of;

Platoon HQ (1 Officer or NCO, 5 men)

Three Rifle Squads, each comprised of 9 men

Total Strength of 708 all ranks (13 Officers and 695 men)

Points of note

The General structure of the original Battalion had been changed slightly. Some units fielded the new Heavy Mortar Platoon; the machine guns had been broken into units providing direct Company support and general Battalion assets. Several new weapons were also now in the hands of the troops in varying numbers.

Machine Gun Platoon- the revised unit now deployed six heavy machine guns in three Sections. However, the new MG42 began to supplement the MG34 during 1943. The MG42 had an even higher rate of fire than its predecessor and was a particularly lethal machine. It too was used in the light role by Rifle Squads, and was easier to mass produce. It never supplanted the MG34 however, which remained in service throughout.

Medium Mortar Platoon - the Platoon remained unchanged apart from an increase in manpower and horse transportation.

Heavy Mortar Platoon- the Germans had encountered a new threat on the Eastern Front, the Red Army's 120 mm mortar. They were suitably impressed and copied the weapon for German use. It was effectively a light artillery piece, and required a notably high concentration of motor transport to move. The Platoon served four tubes, each with a massive range of almost 6000 m. Production never met demand, and in some units additional 8 cm mortars may have been used, or even Infantry guns as described earlier.

The Rifle Company- the new Company was a much smaller unit. The Rifle Squad itself was now targeted for 'downsizing', losing the ammunition bearer for the machine gun element. The loader now officially adopted a rifle, and a second machine pistol replaced a Mauser in the rifle group, possibly carried by the assistant leader. Platoon HQ now had a commander, two runners, a medic, and two supply wagon drivers. Each Platoon now had a two horse wagon, and a one horse wagon with trailer. The commander still carried his MP40 and pistol, the medic a pistol, all others rifles. The Platoon also had an unallocated light machine gun for deployment as required. This may have been deleted in subsequent cutbacks. Curiously, there is no indication of radios being issued to Platoons. Instead, Company HQ listed four signallers among it strength, who were perhaps despatched as necessary. The Company Train carried a thirteenth LMG.

A number of new individual weapons began to reach the troops in 1943, however the rate of supply was too incoherent to attempt to put any figure to. The Gewehr 43 was an attempt to provide a semi automatic rifle to the troops, but still using the same ammunition as the Mauser. It had been preceded by the Gewehr 41, which had proven to be an all round failure in terms of usefulness and reliability. The much modified rifle was a success, and while it never replaced the 1898 Mauser, it offered a real increase in firepower to those units lucky enough to receive it. Likewise, the MG42 served alongside the MG34 as the Squad light machine gun, its high rate of fire proving as devastating in the light role as the heavy. Anti tank potential had also been exponentially increased. For the best part of two years, the German soldiers only reply to a Soviet T34 was to move within spitting distance and assail it with either a Teller mine or a bundle of stick grenades. A new series of one shot disposable anti tank grenades changed that in late 1943. The variously titled Faustpatrone or Panzerfaust gave the individual soldier the ability to successfully destroy a tank, though effective range never increased beyond 100 m as the design was progressively upgraded. Unlike the Bazooka or PIAT, the Panzerfaust was effectively a munition, and was issued in tremendous numbers to offset the declining status of the Panzer arm.

One new weapon deserves special mention, for it was to set the course of rifle development for the next fifty years. The Sturmgewher 44, also known as the MP43, MP44 and Stg45, used an entirely different round to the Mauser. It was designed only for short ranges of up to perhaps 500 m, which allowed the weapon to fire on fully automatic while retaining controllability. It was fed from a thirty round magazine. The rifle was never produced in sufficient quantities to effect the revolution in squad tactics it promised; that was left to the post war Kalashnikov which it inspired. However, the German Army did issue a revised Company organisation to embrace the new weapon.

The first and second Platoons were almost entirely rearmed with the Stg44. The first and second Squads in each Platoon were fully equipped, while the third Squad deployed two MG42s. Platoon commander and runners carried the weapon, the rest of HQ remained as before. An additional MG42 was also issued at Platoon. The third Platoon was armed as previously, but without the extra light machine gun. Company HQ deployed a sniper group of six or seven men, and the Train was abolished. Quite how many units were able to field this ideal is purely speculative, but perhaps only 100,000 assault rifles were ever available.

Summary

The evolution of the German Infantry and later Grenadier Battalion is symptomatic of that of the Army itself. It moved from an offensive minded force to a highly defensive outfit. The increase in mortars and machine guns, and the removal of men from the Rifle Platoons to serve them, showed just how static the Wehrmacht had become. The deep battle concept of Blitzkrieg was replaced by an attrition dominated conflict in the East, and in the West movement was choked by allied airpower. The ordinary infantryman was endlessly expended in countless machine gun posts, fortified farm houses and shattered streets. When massive assaults were undertaken in the final year, they could not be sustained beyond a few days, and the losses suffered by inexperienced men fighting now veteran enemies drained resources even further. It was an inglorious end for an army which had thought itself invincible, but oddly fitting that they became as stagnant as the Nazi ideology which they embraced and carried to so many innocents.