PHONEY WAR 1939

Hitler counted on Allied reluctance to assume an active role in the war, and he was not disappointed. The six-month hiatus known as the Phony War lasted from September 1939 until April 1940, when Germany invaded Norway and Denmark. In the interim, Britain and France made plans that could only fail, because they were based on a negative concept: avoidance of the costly direct attacks that had characterized World War I. New Anglo-French strategy focused on naval blockade and encirclement - indirect methods that were no match for the new blitzkrieg tactics of Nazi Germany.

Allied strategy was based on the belief that the German economy was fundamentally weak, and that holding defensive positions and implementing a naval blockade would win victory by attrition. Unable to deliver a decisive victory against the Allied defensive position in the west, Hitler would be overthrown, bringing peace and the restoration of Polish independence. There were serious flaws to this approach, both in its fundamentals and in its implementation. The Nazi-Soviet Pact reduced the likelihood that Germany would need to station many troops on its eastern frontier, and also constituted a serious breach in the blockade.

Hitler offered peace to the Allies after completing the conquest of Poland, but Chamberlain no longer trusted him, and the war was now less about Poland than about the whole European balance of power. The period from October to April 1940 is often called the 'Phoney War', a derisive term applied by an isolationist American senator. There was action elsewhere, but certainly it was a time of inaction on the Western Front - disastrously so for the Allies. The attrition strategy created a state of mind that avoided bold risks; passivity was all that was necessary. They failed even to develop an effective defensive strategy. The French and British continued to rearm, and a sizeable British Expeditionary Force (BEF) was deployed to France. The problem was the northern part of the line. Belgium and the Netherlands were determined to remain neutral, so refused to engage in any military planning and would not allow Allied forces into their countries. Allied planning had either to be based on leaving the Low Countries to the Germans or on guesses as to their defensive deployments and capabilities. The first option was rejected because it would compromise the whole defensive position. It was planned therefore to advance to the natural defensive lines in Belgium formed by the canals, in the hopes of forming a line with the Belgian Army. Unfortunately, German planning accurately predicted this move, and indeed welcomed it as it would draw the Allied forces forward into the trap to be sprung through the Ardennes.

There was more action at sea. The German Navy (Kriegsmarine), like the Army, was unprepared for war in 1939. The submarine force was small, and the two new battleships, Tirpitz and Bismarck, and the aircraft carrier Graf Zeppelin, were nowhere near completion (the latter never was). As it was, the submariners scored some spectacular early successes, aided by British tardiness in introducing up-to-date anti-submarine measures. Günther Prien in U-47 became the first German Second World War hero when he penetrated the fleet anchorage at Scapa Flow and sank the battleship HMS Royal Oak on 14 October 1939. The aircraft carrier Courageous was another early victim of the U-boats, as, more controversially, was the liner Athenia on 3 September. At the outbreak of war, some surface commerce raiders were at sea, and caused great disruption to merchant shipping. One, Graf Spee, was tracked down in the South Atlantic and engaged in the Battle of the River Plate by two British cruisers, Ajax and Exeter and the New Zealand-manned Achilles. After battering Exeter, Graf Spee took refuge in Montevideo. Deceived into thinking that a larger British force was waiting outside, its captain, Langsdorff, scuttled the ship and committed suicide.

One of Graf Spee's supply ships, Altmark, was intercepted in February in Norwegian coastal waters by HMS Cossack and British prisoners-of-war on board were liberated. The British and French were still considering intervention in Scandinavia to interdict the ore traffic to Germany, at the least by mining Norwegian waters. After the Altmark incident, Admiral Raeder, commander-in-chief of the Kriegsmarine, convinced Hitler that he should pre-empt this in order to protect German interests and prevent the Allies gaining control of key Norwegian ports.

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Between 1920 and 1927, France made military agreements with Belgium, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia but in 1938 the situation had considerably evolved:
• Belgium is completely neutral
• Czechoslovakia is seen as too weak to counter any German or even Italian attack. It is in trouble because of the German minorities in the Sudetes and France doesn't really count anymore with it.
• Romania is between Hungary and Bulgaria and is not really in a situation to be an ally but French armaments are being delivered to Romania (Renault R35 tanks, 105mm field guns, Brandt mortars etc.)
• Poland appears then as the last possible ally. The French intelligence services noted weaknesses about the Polish Army in their reports:
* insufficient instruction of the NCOs
* tactical doctrines not adapted to modern warfare
* insufficient ammunition and equipment
* war industry too weak

But they also noted good points like the instruction of the officers and the ardent patriotism. Poland is seen as a good ally but it is unsure if Poland will fight with the French troops at this time.

During this time, French politicians are also trying very slowly to cooperate with the Soviets in the simple aim to isolate Germany but the latter choose to support Hitler. Nonetheless in 1938, the French Army on its side doesn't see a possible alliance with the Soviets at all. At the beginning of WW2 it is intended to send an allied expeditionary force in Finland ... but the intervention takes finally takes place later in Norway in 1940 with British, French and Polish soldiers.

In February 1938, the British Army has only 6 active divisions and 11 reserve divisions. Great Britain doesn't want to be involved in the coming war and before October 1938 is not implicated in the rearmament programs beside France. Chamberlain and Lord Halifax indicated (as noted by Georges Bonnet) that a ground involvement in continental Europe by the British Army is purely hypothetical and could at the moment only reach 2 incomplete divisions.

Therefore by end 1938 the single allied ground troops that could help France against Germany are those from the Polish army and 2 British divisions. At that time the involvement of Poland is nevertheless also seen very hypothetical because of the foreign policy of Colonel Beck.

The perception from the French high command about the French troops in 1938 is also not very good, many armaments and divisions are lacking, the war industry is insufficient etc. but the clash with Germany is not expected before 1941 (in the worst case for end 1940). France was not prepared at all to enter in a war in 1939 and many types of equipment will lack still by 1940. In 1938-1939, France feels roughly alone to face Germany on the continent and is very cautious. This will be illustrated by the decisions taken in 1939.

By 1941,
• a stronger British involvement
• weapons/equipment/ammunition/trucks/planes deliveries from the USA (including possible French tank production there, buying of former French 75mm guns etc.)
• increased number of modern equipments especially a more modern air force (in May 1940 roughly all the bomber fleet was under transformation, close to nothing was available)
• effects of naval blockades against Germany etc.

The clash was awaited for 1941.

"The Phoney War" October 1939 - April 1940

During the Phoney War the French and German armies didn't remain completely inactive. France and Great-Britain declared war to Germany after the invasion of Poland but at first this is mainly a political gesture.

The French attack on the Sarre area in 1939 is very limited and is much more a probe than a full scale offensive. Such an offensive could in no case be launched at that time. Even engaging all the peacetime units in north-east France would not have been sufficient and there would remain no troops to cover the mobilization of the reserve divisions. The Saar attack was launched on the 7th of September 1939; 4 days after France declared war to Germany. The Sarre area is the single area where the probe could be launched. The neutrality of Luxembourg and Belgium made this 180 km border (from the Rhine to Luxembourg) the single area were French and Germans were in direct contact.

An assault across the Rhine was not envisaged.

The combats by themselves were not really intense; they looked often more like traps, ambushes, a bit like guerrilla warfare against the cautiously advancing French troops. The Germans let only active rearguards units and a huge number of AT and AP mines everywhere. The French troops are for the first time confronted to huge quantities mines. These weapons (especially the AP mines) are rather new and the soldiers don't really know how to deal with so many mines. All the reports insist on the numerous mines hidden everywhere even AP mines in the trees. There were losses on both sides like e.g. in the French 21e DI which sustained 329 losses.

Concerning the ground operations during the Phoney War, except the Sarre limited actions, they consisted in ambushes and deep patrols behind enemy lines along the border. The German "Stosstruppen" and the French "Corps Francs" launched many deep reconnaissance patrols, prepared ambushes, took prisoners etc. behind the enemy lines. The combats often took the form of bloody night skirmishes between patrols and outposts. There were also artillery battles etc. The so-called Phoney War was not a completely quiet period of time and had its number of KIA and WIA.

The Germans continuously reinforced their troops in front of the French:
• 28 August 1939: 6 divisions
• 6 September 1939, after France declared war and just before the French move: 12 divisions
• 12 September 1939: 14-16 divisions
• 20 September 1939: 18-20 divisions

So yes the Germans moved additional troops to this part of the border against the French troops but of course it was far from sufficient to help the Polish troops. This first French attack was before all political but it had to be said that General Weygand is guilty of having told the Polish HQ that a major offensive was currently launched. The French politicians are also guilty for having a foreign policy completely incompatible with the insufficient means they allowed to the French Army (whose modernization and reorganization had roughly just begun).

Later operations were intended (e.g. an attack was planned on Sarrelouis on 22 September 1939) but had no justification at all since Poland was already defeated. The Polish collapse was faster than initially believed. The French HQ thought that Poland would resist at least 6 months ... as they would never has thought that France would collapse on June 25.

France needed 15 days to fully mobilize but launched the operations in the Sarre 4 days only after the declaration of war. If France was to have launched a full scale offensive 15 days after it declared war this would have been around 18 September 1939 at the earliest. This was 4 days after the Polish government had opened negotiations on the terms of its flight to Rumania and the same day that it and its military High Command fled their own country and ordered all their forces to head for neutral borders.

The rapid collapse of Poland left France in a very exposed position. France remained in 1939 roughly alone to face Germany, which had nearly twice its metropolitan population (including Germans from Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland etc.). Germany had also at that time a pact with the Soviets (which led to strikes and some sabotages organized by communists in France to target the French military industry).

The Belgian and Dutch neighbours were at that time neutral; they did not allow the French troops to deploy on their territory before an invasion and had rather tiny armies. Even close to the German invasion, the French forces could not start moving before the German attack, despite the fact that the French had a longer movement to execute to reach their planned positions.

The British could eventually put only 4-5 divisions into Europe in September 1939 and would take 2 years to field a continental-scale army. The French were very cautious in September 1939, but one can see why. The evolution of the German army from 1939 to 1940 shows that the French HQ had really reasons to be cautious. Not ready in 1939 and also unable to really match the innovations in terms of organization of the German army in 1940. The modernization of the French army (in all the fields like the bombers for example) should have enabled to be at level with the new German army in 1941 but the Germans attacked earlier.

What the Polish asked for before all was air support and allied bombings. Everyone studying the state of the French Air Force in 1938-1939 knows that at that time nothing could be done for that. Even around Sedan on 14 May 1940 only about 30 French bombers could be engaged! The British bombers were more numerous. Only around May 22 the French could engage newly transformed air units with modern bombers.

On 3 September 10 British light bombers dropped propaganda tracts over Germany and on 4 September there is the first British bombing mission with several planes over the naval base at Heligoland (5 Blenheim bombers were lost). The first combat involving fighters takes place on 8 September 1939 between French Curtiss H75s and German Me109s with 2 German fighters reported shot down. The same day a Mureaux 115 (observation aircraft) is lost over Karlsruhe. From September to October 1939: 48 German, 37 British and 40 French planes were shot down. In total, between September 1939 and April 1940, 176 German aircraft were lost for 82 British and 57 French ones (= 139 allied aircraft).

Concerning the naval combats in 1939 there were several losses on both sides:

Example of German losses:
• German freighter "Chemnitz": captured by the submarine "Poncelet" on 28 September 1939
• German submarine U-49: heavily damaged by torpedo boat "Siroco" on 20 November 1939
• German merchantmen "Halle" (scuttled) and "Santa Fe" (captured) : found by a joint Franco-British group including "Dupleix" cruiser, counter-torpedo boat "Le Terrible" and counter-torpedo boat "Le Fantasque" on 25 November 1939
• German freighter "Trifels": captured by French auxiliary cruiser "Koutoubia" in November 1939.

Example of French losses:
• Tanker "Rhône": sunk by U-47 at Cap Juby (19 December 1939)
• Light cruiser "Emile Bertin": damaged by the Luftwaffe in Namsos (Norway, 19 April 1940)
• Trawler "La Cancalaise": sunk by a mine (1 May 1940)
• Destroyer "Bison": sunk by the Luftwaffe in Namsos (Norway, 3 May 1940)

In September and October 1939, France on its side lost 1,136 soldiers KIA, 256 sailors KIA, 42 airmen KIA and 370 POW were in German hands according to François Cochet's "Les soldats de la Drôle de Guerre" (2004).

Fall Weiss allowed testing of some Blitzkrieg principles at the tactical level and the German HQ wanted to upscale this concept. The Germans did more than replace losses between the Polish and French campaigns. They created about 50 new divisions and improved their army in terms of equipments, chain of command and doctrine.

After Fall Weiss, the 1., 2., 3. and 4. Leichten-Divisionen became the 6., 7., 3. and 4. Panzerdivisionen) and the 5. PzD has been created. The German army in May 1940 had therefore 10 Panzerdivisionen, 6 motorized infantry divisions and 1 newly created cavalry division.
The armored units were better armed in 1940 than in 1939: more tanks were armed with 3.7cm and 7.5cm guns. The tanks used in 1940 were also far better armored: Panzer IV Ausf.C/D, Panzer III E/F, at the time of the 1940 western campaign also most of the Panzer II had been uparmored.
The 3. and 4. Wellen Infanterie Divisionen from the Polish campaign were largely improved, younger men were enlisted and the equipment was modernized. In 1940, 15 of these divisions were frontline units.

The chain of command was also modified and modernized. During Fall Weiss, the German army lacked some specific HQ especially for armored units. The chain of command was still very traditional. For Fall Gelb a new, more flexible chain of command was developed and could already be used during operation Weserübung.

It was kind of race to modernize the Armies but he French HQ was mostly stuck in old ways of thinking the strategy and was not very smart in using the new modern equipments. One of the best examples of this is Hugh Dowding's trip to France in 1939; he and his PA went to visit the French HQ of their air defences. Dowding came from RAF Fighter Command HQ at Bentley Priory with its underground bunker; the HQ of an integrated system of early warning combined with a practical command-and-control system...and was shown its French counterpart - ONE French air controller sitting in a basement with a public telephone and a blackboard.

Overall the French Army was not dominated by the German Army in terms of motorization and quality of armament. The Germans in mostly all the field simply concentrated the more modern, faster and more powerful elements whereas the French had them spread, reducing their power of decision on the strategic level. What is nonetheless obvious is that he French really lacked AA weapons and AA ammunition to cover their units and also that the bomber fleet was caught at a time when it was only a skeleton.

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