October 27 2009
BATTLE OF MARENGO, 14 JUNE 1800
In 1800 Bonaparte's strategy in northern Italy had been brilliant, but his handling of the battle of Marengo was degraded by poor intelligence that led him to divide his forces. He nearly lost the battle in the morning, but was able to gain victory by the fortuitous return of detached divisions in the afternoon. With his last reserve, the Consular Guard, barely holding, Bonaparte is saved by General Desaix, previously detached with two divisions, returning.
HOHENLINDEN, 3 DECEMBER 1800
Although the defeat at Marengo had forced the Austrians to withdraw from Italy, they continued to hold Germany. When, after an armistice, hostilities reopened in the winter of 1800, an Austrian army under the inexperienced Archduke John was ambushed by General Moreau and his army in the forest of Hohenlinden, east of Munich, on 3 December. Austria now signed an armistice and negotiations towards a peace settlement were begun.
THE MARENGO CAMPAIGN: PREPARATIONS
Aware that the French people desired peace, Bonaparte made overtures to England and Austria, though he insisted on keeping Belgium, Piedmont and Genoa as parts of France, with Switzerland and Holland as French satellites. The Second Coalition rejected his terms. The First Consul had expected as much and already, in January 1800, had ordered Berthier to assemble an Army of Reserve three infantry divisions, a cavalry brigade and the Consular Guard - around Dijon, close to the alpine passes. French control of Switzerland meant that the Army of Reserve could reinforce either Moreau's Army of the Rhine or Massena's Army of Italy. With over 120,000 men, the Army of the Rhine was France's strongest army; the Army of Italy dispersed in the Maritime Alps and on the Ligurian coast numbered only 36,000.
As always, Austria was the principal adversary. General Kray commanded 108,500 men along the Upper Rhine and Danube, while General Melas had about 93,000 in Italy. Initially, Bonaparte considered the Austrian army between the Upper Rhine and Danube as the paramount strategic objective. His intent was for Moreau to pin Kray with one corps in the Black Forest, while the combined Armies of the Rhine and the Reserve swung through Switzerland into the rear of the opponent. This would result in his destruction and open the road to Vienna. If necessary, the Army of Reserve could pivot through Switzerland into Melas's rear to eliminate remaining Austrian forces.
But Moreau was averse to Bonaparte's directions, asserting that the proposed strategy was too risky. The First Consul lacked power to replace the recalcitrant general. Moreau was among the greatest generals of the Republic and his Army of the Rhine as loyal to him as the Army of Italy was to Bonaparte. Any attempt to relieve him might have precipitated a major mutiny. Therefore Bonaparte instructed Moreau to proceed with his frontal offensive, but requested that he detach a corps to the St Gotthard Pass to reinforce the Army of Reserve's strike into the rear of the Austrians in Italy.
Austrian offensive plans assumed that the French were weak in Germany and, as Bonaparte had hoped, discounted the Army of Reserve. Melas was to smash Massena, then advance through the Maritime Alps into southern France to be joined by a British expeditionary force assembling on Minorca. This would draw French troops from the Rhine front, enabling Kray to penetrate through Alsace into France. On 6 April Melas hit Massena's command and split it. Massena was besieged in Genoa with only four weeks' rations for his 10,000 men; General Suchet, with 18,000, was pushed west beyond the River Var. In Germany Moreau hesitated and only attacked in late April. On 3 and 6 May he defeated Kray at Stockach and Moskirch and drove him into a fortified camp at DIm, removing a potential threat to Bonaparte's rear. Moreau's tardiness had delayed Bonaparte's offensive and instead of the promised corps he merely detached a division to the St Gotthard Pass. But finally Bonaparte was able to execute his great strategic manoeuvre sur les derrieres. Time had become of the essence while Massena still pinned 21,000 Austrians and Suchet another 30,000. The First Consul took a gamble. Victory would secure his position, though a major defeat might unseat him and end the consular regime.
MARENGO AND HOHENLINDEN
In the second week of May Bonaparte, who had remained in Paris to prod Moreau into action, arrived at the headquarters of the Army of Reserve, ostensibly an adviser because the new constitution did not allow the First Consul to hold command. He planned to traverse the Alps through five different passes. The easiest passage from Geneva was the Little St Bernard Pass, but Bonaparte rejected this approach because it would require a larger supply train than the more difficult Great St Bernard route which was closer to the depots established on Lake Geneva. Careful arrangements were made to move the main body through this 40-kilometre pass, while, to confuse Melas, small detachments would come over the four remaining passes. On 14 May Bonaparte ordered the advance guard under Lannes to proceed, and by 16 May it had descended as far as Aosta. Six days later the army crossed over the pass, though Fort Aosta held up passage of artillery.
Leaving behind a detachment to invest the fort, Bonaparte proceeded with only 6 small guns. Although aware of Massena's desperate situation in Genoa, Bonaparte did not march to relieve it. Instead, he swung eastwards to cut Austrian communications and capture Milan and its arsenal on 2 June. Here he waited for the arrival of the corps promised by Moreau, in the event only 11,000 men. Meanwhile, Massena had capitulated on 4 June. He had carried out his mission until his men had almost starved to death and then delayed surrender for another two days while negotiating excellent terms. Melas occupied Genoa, but, now aware of the Army of Reserve in his rear, ordered a general concentration at Alessandria, about halfway between Turin and Genoa. By 10 June he had assembled 32,000 men and 100 guns. From Alessandria he could either retreat into Genoa where he would have British naval support, or he could fight for northern Italy.
The Austrian concentration induced Bonaparte to advance west through Montebello, where Lannes won a sharp engagement on 9 June, and late on 13 June he crossed the Scrivia River into the plain east of Alessandria on the far side of the Bormida River. His army numbered about 31,500 men with forty guns. Among the commanders present was Desaix, returned from Egypt on the First Consul's express orders. Convinced that Melas wished to escape, Bonaparte divided his army and detached three divisions, including two under Desaix, to block likely Austrian escape routes.
Not expecting trouble, the remainder bivouacked for the night around the small village of Marengo. When Melas attacked on 14 June a surprised Bonaparte found himself with only 22,000 men and 20 guns facing a far superior enemy supported by 100 cannon. Although the attack developed slowly and there were some defensive positions on the plain, by noon massive Austrian infantry assaults forced the French back. Bonaparte committed his last reserve - the Consular Guard - but, heavily outnumbered and low on ammunition, the battle seemed lost. Desperate messages went out recalling detached formations, while, convinced that the day was won, Melas handed over command to a subordinate. But the French hung on grimly. At about noon Desaix returned with one division and, assisted by Marmont who scraped up 18 guns to provide close fire support, and a charge by the surviving cavalry, the counter-attack stampeded the victorious but fatigued enemy. The unexpected blow by almost fresh troops converted defeat into victory. As Napoleon later commented, 'The fate of a battle is a single moment ... the decisive moment arrives, the moral spark is kindled and the smallest reserve force settles the issue.' And he had learned from his close call.
Never again would he disperse his main force in the face of the enemy and whenever possible he would retain a strong reserve.
The Marengo campaign was a strategic masterpiece, but the conduct of the battle was far from brilliant and the official account would be rewritten several times to enhance Napoleon's reputation. Meanwhile, at the cost of 6,000 casualties, including Desaix who was shot leading the assault, the First Consul had his victory. Austrian casualties equalled the French, though they also lost 8,000 prisoners and 40 cannons. Melas was stunned and the next day signed an armistice evacuating all of Lombardy up to the Mincio River, halting all fighting until Vienna had responded to a peace proposal. Even so, the Austrian army was not destroyed. Re-forming behind the Mincio it still numbered some 55,000 men and 300 guns. In Germany Moreau advanced to Munich, and in July concluded an armistice that lasted until November.
One more victory was needed to finish the Second Coalition. This Moreau provided when the fighting resumed. In Germany, Archduke Charles not only refused to accept command, but he also advised that Austria should make peace while there was still an army. But Vienna decided to try once more. With the inexperienced eighteen-year-old Archduke John in command, hostilities recommenced on 22 November with an attempt to crush Moreau's left flank and cut his communications. Moreau ambushed the Austrian columns on 2 December at Hohenlinden, 33 kilometres east of Munich, and routed them. This disaster convinced Austria to sign an armistice on 25 December, which was followed on 9 February 1801 by the Peace of Luneville, confirming the terms of Campo Formio.
Britain continued the conflict alone, her position complicated when Tsar Paul I organized a league of northern states - Russia, Sweden, Denmark and Prussia - threatening her naval supplies. Britain responded with an attack on Copenhagen, destroying major elements of the Danish fleet. Soon thereafter, Paul was murdered in a palace revolt and his successor Alexander I dismantled the league. Even so, England was weary of war, while Bonaparte wished to consolidate his regime. As a result, after prolonged haggling, the Treaty of Amiens was signed on 27 March 1802.
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