CHAR VERSUS PANZER

Given the rapidity of the German victory over France, Belgium and Holland and the pivotal role played by the Panzer Divisions in bringing this about, the superficial judgement at the time was that German tanks must not only have been more numerous than those of the Allied armies, but also superior to them. However, we will need to qualify how this term was understood. For the purposes of immediate explanation, we will assume that 'superior' was employed as a shorthand for greater numbers, heavier armour and more effective fire power.

a) Numbers

There is no question that, as regards the first of these greater numbers, the Western Allies possessed at the beginning of Fall Gelb a decided superiority in the numbers of tanks that they could field compared to the Germans at the beginning of Fall Gelb. While full breakdowns by tank type and their totals for each of the ten Panzer Divisions are provided in tabular form, the overall number of tanks deployed by the Panzerwaffe for combat operations on 10 May 1940 amounted to 2,582 machines of all types. This was exceeded by a considerable margin by the number possessed by the French Army alone. The French maintained a tank park of some 4,360 machines of all types, of which 250 were stationed overseas in their colonial territories at that date. By far and away the bulk and best of France's armoured strength was stationed on the north-east Front ready to deploy into Belgium once news had been received of the opening of the German offensive. Not only did the French possess a quantitative advantage over the Panzerwaffe in theatre, but also many of their tanks were also superior in the thickness of armour protection they carried and in the calibre of the armament they mounted. Even the Germans themselves accepted that a number of the tank types being fielded by the French Army were superior to their own, the best example of this being the Somua S-35 cavalry medium tank, regarded by many armour pundits of the time as one of the finest in the world.

Although of lesser importance, the armoured contributions of the British and the Belgians served to raise total Allied numbers to just over 4,000 machines. This numerical strength explains why General Gamelin was so confident that the Allied tank force would crush that of the Germans when they invaded Belgium en masse which, as we have seen, he was absolutely convinced they would.

b) Armour

The greatest disparity between the tanks of the Germans and the French lay in the area of armour protection. Even the heaviest Panzer in service at the time of the invasion of France - the Panzer IV Ausf D- weighing in at a modest 18 tons, mounted armour no thicker than 30mm across its frontal arc, although the gun mantlet was formed of 35mm of rolled armour plate. The equivalent machine in the French Army at the time - the Char B1Bis - at nearly double the weight of a Pz, had frontal armour double the thickness of the pz at 60mm. At the time of the German offensive in the west, the two tanks planned to become the standard equipment of the Panzerwaffe were woefully protected.

At the other end of the spectrum, the most numerous German tank was the diminutive Panzer I light tank, whose maximum armour thickness of just 13mm was not even enough to withstand a high velocity rifle bullet. It was to prove appallingly vulnerable to every calibre of gun mounted on French tanks and to Allied anti-tank guns. This machine, and the later Panzer II light tank - the second most numerous German tank to see service in the French campaign - had also proved vulnerable in Poland to enemy anti-tank rifle fire by virtue of their very thin armour. Remedial action was undertaken in the months following the Polish campaign to improve the protection of the Panzer II by the addition of rivetted plates of 20mm armour. Although only some 70 per cent of the Panzer II inventory had been improved in this fashion by 10 May, this did serve to increase the maximum thickness across the vital frontal arc of those machines to approximately 35mm, and this enabled the Germans to rectify the design's most evident weakness. Nonetheless, both machines were castigated by their operators in the French campaign as being 'unfit for combat'.

Although the French Army was still deploying quite a number of its early AMC and AMR light tanks whose armour was equivalent to that of the Panzer I and II, the most numerous and modern machines of this class, namely the Renault 35, Hotchkiss 35/39 and Renault 35, all mounted a maximum of 40mm of armour as standard. Thus, the most common French light tank in May 1940 carried thicker armour than did the heaviest Panzer!

It was, however, when the Germans faced the British Matilda 11 that they encountered the tank bearing the heaviest armour of any in the 1940 campaign, Although the thinnest carried by this machine was just 20mm, found on its hull and turret tops, the 78mm of its cast hull front and nose rendered it invulnerable to any weapon carried by any German AFV, in 1940. As was to be found later when it was also encountered in the Western Desert, the 88mm Flak 18/36 gun was needed to despatch the beast!

While in the aftermath of defeat the myth that the Germans were fielding more numerous and better armoured tanks became a convenient excuse to explain away the rapid Allied collapse, the matter was actually made worse by virtue of the fact that the weapons carried by these same Allied tanks were also better than those of the Panzers!

c) Firepower

The twin 7.92mm MG-13 machine guns carried by the Panzer I rendered the type suitable for little more then infantry support, whilst the 20mm KwK L\130 cannon of the Panzer II was ineffective in penetrating all of the French types. However, it could do so with the armour of the British light and cruiser tanks, and these were penetrated at all ranges. In post-campaign analysis, the 37mm calibre gun mounted on the Panzer Mark III and the Pak36 anti-tank gun were castigated as being inadequate to penetrate enemy tanks. It was for this reason that this weapon acquired the unflattering sobriquet of the army's 'door knocker'. Numerous reports spoke of 37mm shells from both weapons simply bouncing off the armour of tanks like the Somua and Char Bl-Bis. What emerged as the most effective tank mounted weapon against enemy tanks in the French campaign was the low velocity, 75mm KwK37 L\24 gun carried on the Panzer IV. This weapon had not been designed for this purpose, as it was essentially a low velocity howitzer appropriate for the Panzer's designated task of supporting infantry end other tanks. As the largest calibre weapon carried by any of the Panzers, it fired the heaviest shell and, when employing the limited number of Sprenggrenate (armour piercing shells) ammunition it carried in combat (with the majority carried being HE), it was able to take on and defeat the Somua S-35, albeit only up to a range of 600 metres. Beyond this distance, the effectiveness of the weapon fell off rapidly. However, even the 75mm weapon found difficulty penetrating the heavier frontal armour of the Char B1. One German officer later observed that in a one to one with either of these French tanks, even the Panzer IV would have little chance of success.

On paper, which is in terms of a straight comparison in the size and effectiveness of weaponry, most French tanks also had an advantage across the board relative to those carried by the Panzers. Apart from the older AMR 35 which mounted, like the Panzer I, nothing other than a machine gun, all other French designs fielded weapons of 25mm calibre or more. As the most numerous type in service with the French Army in 1940, the H-35 class of light cavalry tanks carried a 37mm or 40mm weapon, double the size of that carried by their German counterparts, Even the obsolescent FT-17, dating to the First World War and still in service in some numbers in 1940, albeit mainly in reserve units, mounted a 37mm gun. The two most formidable French machines - namely the Somua S-35 and Char Bl-Bis - both mounted a variant of the excellent French 47mm anti-tank gun in their turrets, while the latter also disposed of a75mm weapon in its lower front hull.

The 2 pounder OF (quick firing) gun was the main armament of the British Army cruiser tanks and of the Matilda II heavy infantry support tank encountered by the Germans in the French Campaign. Although later castigated by its users in the Western Desert, primarily for its lack of a high explosive shell, the 2pdr was none the less regarded as one of the best weapons of its type in the world in 1940. A barrel length of 50 calibres allowed the gun to tire an AP round at quite a high velocity, thus permitting British tankers to hit the more lightly armoured German Panzers at a greater range. It was superior to its nearest enemy equivalent, the 37mm weapon mounted on the Panzer III.

Char versus Panzer: The factors that really mattered!

Notwithstanding the 'on paper' superiority of French armour in particular areas, the 1940 campaign would illustrate the degree to which these were degraded by a whole series of other factors. These ranged from French Army doctrine and organisation through to general design limitations and other issues, all of which combined to render the whole, in the crucible of war, to be substantially less than the sum of its parts.

It is a truism that French armour doctrine at the start of the Second World War was in essence no different to that at the end of the First. The roles of the tank were that of infantry support and the provision of a mechanised equivalent of the cavalry. These two suppositions governed all aspects of tank unit organisation, their use, design and development In the inter-war period. It meant that when faced with a technologically inferior enemy whose tank arm was predicated upon a far more dynamic concept of the use of armour and air power, the French were unable to respond in an effective way and went down to defeat. Cited as a maxim in pre-war French Service Regulations, tanks had to observe the requirement of only moving as fast as the infantry they were supporting. In consequence, the specifications issued for new machines to fulfil the support role rarely required that they have a maximum speed beyond 17 mph. These machines formed the core of the five Light Cavalry Divisions in 1940. These comprised a light mechanised brigade equipped with the H-35/R-35/H-38/H-39 tanks, Panhard armoured cars and mechanised infantry. It is a measure of their anachronistic structure that they still included a brigade of cavalry.

The Cavalry Division analogue was to be found in the three Divisions Legeres Mecaniques (abbreviated hereafter to DLM). These light mechanised divisions were seen conceptually as mechanised cavalry. Their primary role was to advance to the fore of the main force and screen its movements - a role that Joachim Murat, Napoleon's commander of cavalry, would have related to without difficulty save for the fact that these steeds were of steel and not flesh and blood I Fielding a mixture of Hotchkiss light tanks and the more formidable Somua S-35s, two of these divisions would be involved in the largest tank clash of the campaign at Hannut in Belgium on 12 and 13 May.

Evidence, however, that the contribution played by the Panzerwaffe in the rapid defeat of Poland had not gone by way of the board in France can be seen in how between September 1939 and May 1940 the French had moved very quickly to create their own equivalent of the Panzer Division. Four Divisions Cuirassees Rapide (hereafter abbreviated to DCR) were set up in short order. Three were already part of the order of battle on 10 May. The fourth, as yet still forming, was under the command of a certain Colonel Charles de Gaulle (one of the few minds in the French camp in the 1930s who had been in tune with German armoured developments and had argued for the same in France). With a mechanised infantry battalion and two battalions of artillery, the core of these formations was built around two battalions of 60 Char B1Bis. This was the premier tank of the French Army in 1940. However, it had not been designed for rapide. Its original specification had called for a machine to provide infantry support! The top speed of just 18mph illustrates the point. More numerous were 78 Hotchkiss H-39s that were also organised in two battalions. When enabled to take up static positions, the heavy frontal armour and weapons of French machines enabled them to deal without difficulty with all German tanks -their armour being so weak.

When denied that facility, they succumbed rapidly to the superior movement of the Panzer formation operating in concert with other arms and the Luftwaffe. This was bound to happen at any time the Germans effected a breakthrough of the French line - be it held by infantry or armour - because of the latter's attention to the maintenance of contiguous lines. This hangover from the Great War, when trench lines dictated the requirement to preserve a coherent front, contained within it the seeds of many errors made in 1940 by the French Army. By default it conferred many tactical and strategic gains on the Germans, who rapidly and ruthlessly exploited every opportunity provided when this effect of this anachronistic doctrine was employed.

Although the new DCRs appeared formidable on paper, they had been set up to emulate a formation whose armour doctrine was alien to the French military mind. It would take more than a few months and a reorganisation of assets to copy what the Germans had done in Poland. Herein is to be seen a profound weakness in the design of French armour that was to impact on its ability to duplicate the mobility of the Panzer Divisions in Poland. We have already alluded to the slowness of French tank designs. It was also the case that the efficiency of any Char in battle in 1940 was seriously handicapped by the one-man turret they all carried. To the commander of the vehicle, who had to identify the target, also fell the tasks of aiming the gun, rotating the turret, loading the gun and firing it. Nor was he helped by the poor view provided for him by limited optics. However, all of the aforementioned were then compounded by the slow traverse of the turret.

Contrast this with German design practice. Unlike their French counterparts, the German medium Panzers had crews of five men. Representing, as they did, the machines that would see the Panzerwaffe through to 1943, and in the case of the Pz IV through to the defeat in 1945, the insistence by the Heeres Waffenamt on a three-man turret design was proved by experience. A commander, loader and aimer were deemed to provide the best arrangement for the division of labour in carrying out those tasks, thereby providing the optimum efficiency of the workload of a crew when in battle. With the commander able to observe events from his cupola and communicate his orders via a throat microphone, this permitted the Panzer to rapidly move and shift both vehicle and main armament from target to target. The trump card, however, for the German way of war in 1940 was the radios carried by all Panzers, but very few Chars. In a real sense, they were the war winner.

It was the onboard radios carried by all Panzers that permitted them to manoeuvre rapidly on the battlefield to take account of contingencies as they arose. It was accepted even in 1940 that 'the primary method of command in combat' was the radio. Drilling in the use of this medium was deemed by the Panzerwaffe to be as important as firing accurately. By 1940, the Panzerwaffe had had years of practice in war games and operations in which to develop their radio procedures and inculcate the protocols of such in their tank crews. A short insight into the sophistication of such methods and their common usage through the tank arm in 1940 can be gleaned from this instruction manual extract:

'Movements are carried out according to radio command, previous orders or signals (although radio was accepted as being the most workable means of command - author comment). On the order to move out, all tanks start moving uniformly and at first, straight ahead. If a change of formation is desired at the same time as the start of the move, the formation order is given first, followed by the order to move out. Distances, intervals and formation are assumed while driving .... When changing direction of the march, the commander orders 'Follow me!' or 'Direction of march is... !' while giving point or compass bearing. If a formation change is to take place at the same time, the march direction is given first, followed by the new formation. Platoons that have four, instead of five, tanks execute these formations and manoeuvres in analogous fashion'.

The degree of control implicit in such a short extract and the sophistication required to effect it betokens a great expertise in radio employment. Herein lies the French bafflement at the ability of the Germans to move their tanks around en masse and effect a rapid concentration of effort and firepower where they desired it. This is hardly surprising when very few French tanks actually possessed radios. Apart from a cultural obsession with radio security, which provides one explanation as to why they were not fitted in their tanks, the other problem arose again directly out of the perception that tanks were only to provide support for the infantry. In such circumstances, radios were not necessary, signal flags would suffice and, once drawn up in their static lines facing the enemy, it was thought to be enough for an officer or runner to move from tank to tank passing on orders in person by word of mouth!

The sophisticated German radio net went beyond tank to tank. It also permitted a degree of communication between ground and air that had never been seen before. Attached to the Panzer Divisions were Fliegerleittrupps-tactical air control parties - which were provided with wheeled vehicles. At this juncture of the war there were too few SPWs available to be fitted out for this role, although they would become a more familiar sight from 1941 onward. Their task was to be in close proximity to the advancing Panzers. When the tank divisions' own towed artillery could not eliminate a target, the Fliegerleit offizier-the air control officer - elicited what air support was available and contacted the pilots on their frequency. In 1940, it was the Stuka and the Henschel Hs-123 which provided this help, with the bulk of the air support being provided by the former. The air control officer would then talk the pilots into the area so that they could recognise the target. In the meantime, troops with the Panzers would have demarcated their own positions relative to that of the enemy by laying out on the ground special identification panels. It was later claimed that the support given to Guderian's thrust to the channel saw the most effective use of air support of the war, with Stukas being on hand to deal with targets within 15-20 minutes of being called.